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Good Science, Bad Regulation, and
Toxic Risk Assessment
Howard Latint
Regulation of toxic substances is an extremely complex, uncertain, and
controversial enterprise. The regulatory process is customarily divided into
two discrete functions: risk assessment ostensibly is a scientific activity
that develops estimates of health hazards at varying exposure levels, while
risk management is a political activity that balances competing interests
and values to determine whether identified toxic risks should be consid-
ered unacceptable or tolerable.' This sharp distinction between the scien-
tific and social policy dimensions of toxics regulation is embodied in the
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) guidelines for estimating car-
cinogenic hazards, which provide that risk assessments must "use the most
scientifically appropriate interpretation" and should "be carried out inde-
pendently from considerations of the consequences of regulatory action."2
The requirement for adoption of the "most scientifically appropriate
interpretation" reflects EPA's current priority on attaining "good science"
in risk-assessment proceedings.3 In other words, EPA and other federal
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1. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 3 (1983) [hereinafter NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL]:
Risk assessment is the use of the factual base to define the health effects of exposure of individ-
uals or populations to hazardous materials and situations. Risk management is the process of
weighing policy alternatives and selecting the most appropriate regulatory action, integrating
the results of risk assessment with engineering data and with social, economic, and political
concerns to reach a decision. . . .At least some of the controversy surrounding regulatory
actions has resulted from a blurring of the distinction between risk assessment policy and risk
management policy.
See also Albert, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Revised Interim Guideline for the Health
Assessment of Suspect Carcinogens, 19 BANBURY REPORT, RISK QUANTITATION AND REGULATORY
Po.iCy, 307, 308 (D. Hoel, R. Merrill & F. Perera eds. 1985).
2. EPA Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,992-93 (1986)
[hereinafter EPA Carcinogen Guidelines].
3. The term "good science" in quotation marks is used to denote Agency attempts to base risk
assessments only on the most plausible present scientific evidence, however provisional the scientific
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agencies now stress the need for scientifically credible risk assessments and
presume that their analyses should be grounded exclusively on the best
available scientific theories and data even if the resulting predictions do
not achieve the degree of reliability ordinarily required for valid scientific
conclusions.
This Article challenges the conventional view that scientific perspectives
should dominate the risk-assessment process. To paraphrase Talleyrand,
risk assessment is too important and too uncertain to be left exclusively to
the risk-assessors. I contend instead that social policy considerations must
play as prominent a role in the choice of risk estimates as in the ultimate
determination of which predicted risks should be deemed unacceptable.
Part I of this Article evaluates the risk-assessment principles in EPA's
carcinogen guidelines. Part II examines risk-assessment practices adopted
in EPA's proceedings on the carcinogen benzene and questions the scien-
tific basis for the Agency's 1984 decision to control two categories of ben-
zene sources while exempting other types of dischargers from regulation.4
These discussions show that risk-assessment efforts in regulatory proceed-
ings seldom achieve professionally accepted standards of scientific validity
and inevitably entail implicit or explicit policy judgments.
Part III of the Article describes the social ramifications of EPA's cur-
rent emphasis on "good science." In practice, this risk-assessment focus is
likely to result in reduced public protection against potential toxic
hazards, increased regulatory decisionmaking costs, and expanded oppor-
tunities for obstructive behavior by Agency bureaucrats or private parties
hostile to toxics regulation. These consequences might be tenable if they
were the product of an explicit political decision, but they should not arise
unintentionally from the Agency's single-minded pursuit of "good science"
in an area where reliable scientific conclusions are difficult or impossible
to attain.
Part IV describes social policy criteria that agencies could use to sup-
plement scientific evidence on toxic hazards. These factors include the
hierarchy of legislative priorities in particular regulatory statutes, the
expense and time requirements associated with individualized assessments
judgments may be.
4. See EPA National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Regulation of Benzene;
Response to Public Comments, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,480 (1984) [hereinafter EPA Regulation of
Benzene]; EPA National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Equipment
Leaks (Fugitive Emission Sources), 40 C.F.R. §§61.110-.112 (1987); EPA National Emission Stan-
dards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Proposed Standards for Benzene Emissions from Coke By-
Product Recovery Plants, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,522 (1984) [hereinafter EPA Proposed Standards for Ben-
zene Emissions]; EPA National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emis-
sions from Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, and Benzene Storage Vessels;
Withdrawal of Proposed Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,558 (1984) [hereinafter EPA Withdrawal of
Proposed Standards].
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of recurring scientific issues, the potential for catastrophic results from
erroneous risk estimates, and the likelihood that specific uncertainties can
or cannot be resolved in the near future. Contrary to EPA's carcinogen
guidelines, analysis of regulatory purposes and possible social conse-
quences-not attempts at "good science" alone-should shape risk-
assessment efforts. I believe statutory preferences for safety from toxic
substances should not be undermined by low-visibility adoption of specu-
lative risk-assessment practices that cannot be grounded on reliable sci-
ence. Nevertheless, my objective in Part IV is not to advocate the policies I
personally regard as desirable, but instead to examine a range of social
policy criteria that could be incorporated in the risk-assessment process
after appropriate public discussion.
Three interconnected themes, which are developed throughout the ensu-
ing discussion, support the Article's central thesis that explicit social pol-
icy choices should influence agency selections of risk-assessment principles
and specific risk estimates:
Inadequate scientific knowledge and inadequate data usually prevent
derivation of risk estimates based on reliable science. Toxic risk assess-
ment suffers from fundamental uncertainties about causal mechanisms for
cancer and other hazards, extrapolative relationships between high-dose
and low-dose responses and between animal test data and human risks,
latent effects and latency periods, special sensitivities in exposed subpopu-
lations, synergistic or co-carcinogenic effects of various substances, past
and present exposure levels, dispersion patterns for contaminants, and vir-
tually every other area of required knowledge.5 These uncertainties gener-
ally preclude reliable assessments of relevant effects, and there is no scien-
tific consensus on how they should be resolved. For example, conflicting
risk estimates submitted in Food and Drug Administration (FDA) pro-
ceedings on saccharine varied by more than a millionfold;6 and predictions
5. For example, William Ruckeishaus, then Administrator of EPA, observed:
In assessing a suspected carcinogen ... there are uncertainties at every point where an
assumption must be made: in calculating exposure, in extrapolating from high doses where we
have seen an effect to the low doses typical of environmental pollution; in what we may expect
when humans are subjected to much lower doses of a substance that, when given in high doses,
caused tumors in laboratory animals; and finally, in the very mechanisms by which we suppose
the disease to work.
Ruckelshaus, Science, Risk, and Public Policy, 221 SCIENCE 1026, 1027 (1983). For policy-oriented
discussions of the effects of scientific and medical uncertainties on toxic substances regulation, see
NATIONAl. RESEARCH COUNCIL, DECISION MAKING IN "THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY (1977) [herinafter EPA DECISION MAKING]; Latin, The "Significance" of Toxic Health
Risks: An Essay on Legal Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, 10 EcoloGY L.Q. 339 (1982); Mc-
Garity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Ques-
tions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729 (1979).
6. See OSHA, Identification, Classification and Regulation of Potential Occupational Carcino-
gens, 45 Fed. Reg. 5002, 5200 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. §§1900.101-1990.152 (1987)) [hereinaf-
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of the hazards posed by TCE, a drinking-water contaminant, varied by
many millions.' One discussion of TCE regulation noted that the "esti-
mates provide a range of uncertainty equivalent to not knowing whether
one has enough money to buy a cup of coffee or pay off the national
debt."'
Under current regulatory practices, Agency scientists produce risk
assessments that seldom approach the level of reliability normally ex-
pected of scientific findings; indeed, many estimates are little more than
educated guesses. 9 Yet, the choice among competing estimates-a predic-
tion of only a minuscule hazard or one a million times greater-can deter-
mine whether toxic exposures are characterized as "acceptable" or "unac-
ceptable" irrespective of any values in the risk-management process.
Absent a scientific consensus on which risk-assessment principles should
be applied, I contend that an agency's choice among competing risk esti-
mates should not be exclusively a result of provisional scientific judgments.
If substantial uncertainty exists about the extent of toxic hazards and the
possible benefits from risk reduction, social consequences and political val-
ues must play an integral role in determining which speculative risk esti-
mates are adopted.
There is an inherent tension between the disciplinary norms of good
science and good regulation. Unlike in pure scientific research, where the
proper response to uncertainty is reservation of judgment pending the
development of adequate data and testable hypotheses, the risk-assessment
process cannot be suspended without significant social consequences. A
finding that a vital issue is currently indeterminate would be entirely con-
sistent with the practice of good science, but "no decision" on a possible
toxic hazard inescapably is a decision that promotes interests which bene-
fit from the regulatory status quo.1" Risk assessment is not driven by the
pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, the explicit goal of science, but by
the need to decide whether potentially severe health hazards should be
allowed to continue or whether high control costs should be imposed with
potentially severe economic consequences. Thus, scientists in regulatory
proceedings are expected to produce "answers" in a timely manner even if
their predictions are highly speculative. Any reluctance to relax the stan-
ter OSHA Generic Cancer Policy]; Leape, Quantitative Risk Assessment in Regulation of Environ-
mental Carcinogens, 4 HARV. ENVT.. L. REV. 86, 103 (1980).
7. See Cothern, Coniglio & Marcus, Estimating Risk to Human Health, 20 ENVTL. SC. &
TECH. 111, 113-15 (1986).
8. Id. at 115.
9. These speculative estimates are often presented in misleadingly precise quantitative terms. See
infra text accompanying notes 91-144, 174-84.
10. See Bazelon, Science and Uncertainty: A Jurist's View, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 209, 213
(1981); Latin, supra note 5, at 339.
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dards of proof and certainty generally required of valid science may intro-
duce a bias in favor of regulatory inaction.
Science aims at the dispassionate pursuit of truth. In contrast, scientists
in risk-assessment proceedings frequently represent industries, labor
unions, consumers, environmentalists, or agency bureaucracies with great
interests at stake. These affiliations may often explicitly or unintentionally
color interpretations of available evidence."1 Scientists seldom base conclu-
sions on data and experiments that cannot be reproduced, but information
in regulatory hearings is routinely submitted by affected parties and fre-
quently cannot be replicated or effectively challenged by other partici-
pants." Scientists tend to design research studies in light of which data
are available and which experiments may be feasible, whereas the critical
questions in risk-assessment proceedings are usually determined by statu-
tory or judicial requirements that need not be responsive to the state of
scientific knowledge.1" Budgetary and time limitations often influence the
scientific research agenda, but no good scientist would feel that definitive
answers must be produced irrespective of resource constraints. The oppo-
site predisposition may be appropriate for good regulators.1 ' These com-
ments are not intended to call into question the competence or ethics of all
scientists who participate in risk assessments. Rather, the point is that the
risk-assessment process is fundamentally shaped by the requirements, con-
straints, and adversarial climate of regulation, not by the disciplinary
norms of science.
The illusion that risk assessment is a purely scientific activity reduces
the visibility and political accountability of policy judgments that often
11. For discussions of how conflicting private and bureaucratic incentives may impede effective
environmental regulation, see Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uni-
form Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1282-97 (1985);
Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L.
REV. 1256, 1274-75, 1338-53 (1981). Scientists are no more immune to cognitive dissonance and
wishful thinking than are nonscientists.
12. For example, agencies are largely dependent on polluting industries for information on cur-
rent discharge levels and on the cost/profitability criteria needed to assess whether proposed standards
would be economically feasible. See EPA Benzene Emissions from Maleic Anhydride Plants,
Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, and Benzene Storage Vessels; Proposed Withdrawal of Proposed Stan-
dards, 49 Fed. Reg. 8386, 8389 (1984); Latin, The Feasibility of Occupational Health Standards: An
Essay on Legal Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 583, 605-11 (1983).
13. For examples of cases in which reviewing courts required quantitative risk assessments based
on their interpretation of statutory provisions, without regard to whether the agencies were able to
produce reliable risk estimates given the level of available data and scientific knowledge, see Industrial
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980); Gulf S. Insulation v.
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1983); Texas Indep. Ginners Ass'n v.
Marshall, 630 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1980).
14. When harm will be substantially irreversible, as in the cases of carcinogenic exposures, extinc-
tion of species, or acid-rain contamination of lakes and forests, the problem of how long regulators
should wait for "enough" information to enable reliable scientific judgments is likely to be controver-
sial. See Latin, supra note 11, at 1282-83 & n.78; Latin, supra note 5, at 384-85.
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guide regulatory decisions on toxic hazards. A comparison of conflicting
risk-assessment principles adopted by agencies under different administra-
tions shows that regulators frequently do consider policy criteria when
they select specific risk estimates.1" Federal agencies have recently
employed controversial risk-assessment assumptions to justify inaction on
some hazardous substances. Regulators have also attempted to make de-
terminations based on "good science" without considering the implications
of this approach for decisionmaking costs, regulatory delays, and opportu-
nities for obstructive or strategic behavior by affected parties. Risk asses-
sors often respond to scientific uncertainties by adopting conservative
safety-oriented positions on some important issues while they use best-
current-scientific-guess, middle-of-the-range, methodological-convenience,
or least-cost treatments on other material issues. EPA and other agencies
have never explained the scientific or policy rationales underlying these
inconsistent treatments of uncertainty, and risk managers may not recog-
nize that substantial inconsistency exists. In light of these diverse risk-
assessment practices, I contend that regulatory policy judgments as well as
scientific judgments must be applied coherently, explained forthrightly,
and tested actively through public debate.
Several disparate reasons may explain the current emphasis on attain-
ing "good science" in regulatory proceedings on toxic substances. After
unsuccessful attempts to achieve environmental deregulation, the Reagan
Administration adopted a strategy purportedly designed to improve the
efficiency of pollution control programs." One EPA Assistant Administra-
tor contended that efficient standards must be based on "scientific evidence
and not on rumor and soothsaying,"'" and another official noted that the
new cancer guidelines "hopefully will add to the scientific credibility" of
agency decisions. 8 In a recent Science symposium on risk assessment, two
EPA regulators claimed that the guidelines were intended "to reduce pos-
sible confusion by dealing consistently and openly with the assumptions
and extrapolations that are required to bridge the gap between scientific
findings and the risk assessments derived from them.""
Critics of the new approach regard Administration prescriptions for
"good science" as a subterfuge designed to accomplish de facto deregula-
tion. Dr. J. Donald Millar, the Director of the National Institute of
15. See infra text accompanying notes 44-52, 62-69, 198-202.
16. See Latin, supra note 11, at 1271-72.
17. Eidsness, An Administration Sold on Clean Water, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1982, at 30, col. 4.
18. Shabecoff, Administration Drafting New Policy on Regulating Cancer-Causing Agents, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 4, 1982, at 32, col. 2 (quoting Dr. Denis Prager, Assistant Director of the Office of
Science and Technology).
19. Russell & Gruber, Risk Assessment in Environmental Policy Making, 236 SCIENCE 286,
286-87 (1987).
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Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), observed that the previous
carcinogen policy was being revised because "the chemical industry finds
it to be an onerous responsibility."2 Congressman, now Senator, Albert
Gore, Jr., similarly argued: "The upper echelon science policy-makers
have made a crass, calculated, cynical change in the traditional policy of
seeking to prevent cancer.''21 He claimed that the Administration has
"reached way down into the processes of government to control the sci-
ence. They think that if you control the science you can control the con-
clusions about whether to control this or that substance. '"22
Both sets of characterizations may have some validity. Many scientists
and regulators sincerely believe that the quality of risk assessments must
be improved through application of the latest scientific findings, while
requirements for "good science" may also be motivated by the Adminis-
tration's outcome-oriented recognition that dispositive scientific evidence is
unavailable on many contested issues. The critical fact is that this "good
science" orientation, whatever its initial purposes, is becoming entrenched
in a myriad of regulatory programs as agencies increasingly rely on quan-
titative risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, or cost-benefit analysis23 to
justify pollution control decisions and to establish staff priorities.2 EPA's
carcinogen guidelines, for example, are likely to be the most influential
statement of federal risk-assessment practices for years to come, and yet
they have not been scrutinized from public policy and legal perspectives.
It is important to stress that thousands of lives and billions of dollars in
regulatory costs may depend on an agency's choice of controversial risk-
assessment principles. The primary purpose of this Article is to encourage
agency officials, legislators, and other legal decisionmakers to examine
critically the scientific limitations and broader public policy implications
of alternative risk-assessment treatments.
I. Risk-Assessment Principles in EPA's Carcinogen Guidelines
Social policy judgments have always been perceived as central to the
risk-management process, and regulatory agencies have assigned different
20. Shabecoff, supra note 18, at 32, col. 2 (quoting J. Donald Millar).
21. Marshall, EPA's High-Risk Carcinogen Policy, 218 SCIENCE 975, 975 (1982).
22. Id.
23. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, for example, recently
approved EPA's controversial decision to employ cost-benefit analysis for hazardous air pollutant
standards promulgated under §112 of the Clean Air Act. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. EPA, 25 E.R.C. 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (No. 85-1150). The Court of Appeals sitting en banc
vacated the panel's opinion and heard oral arguments on April 29, 1987. On July 28, 1987, the en
banc court remanded the case. 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
24. See, e.g., Russell & Gruber, supra note 19, at 287-89; Lave, Health and Safety Risk Analy-
ses: Information for Better Decisions, 236 SCIENCF 291 (1987).
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weights to competing factors in response to changing political or economic
conditions. Under the Carter Administration, risks above one fatality per
million exposed people were usually treated as "unacceptable" if feasible
control measures were available.25 Reagan Administration agencies have
concluded that risks as high as one in ten thousand, or even one in a
hundred in some settings, are tolerable.26 These risk-management deci-
sions reflect different ideological preferences and different assumptions
about the economic and political effects of toxic substances regulation.
Similar considerations implicitly influence risk-assessment practices and
resulting estimates of toxic hazards. Indeed, any decision by regulators to
stress "good science" with the possible consequence of reduced public
safety is itself a debatable policy choice. Yet, social policies and values
adopted in risk-assessment proceedings typically have not been made
explicit nor applied in a consistent manner.27
During the Carter Administration, EPA, OSHA, FDA, and the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) formed an Interagency Regu-
latory Liaison Group (IRLG) to develop a common set of risk-assessment
principles. The IRLG guidelines, which were intended to achieve consis-
tent resolutions of recurring scientific issues, emphasized the need for
safety-oriented protective treatments under conditions of uncertainty.2"
OSHA and EPA also created generic cancer policies partly motivated by
their desire to prevent repetitive submissions of scientific theories and sup-
porting data that the IRLG had rejected as unreliable.29 For example,
25. See Cross, Beyond Benzene: Establishing Principles for a Significance Threshold on Regulat-
able Risks of Cancer, 35 EMORY L.J. 1, 17 (1986). Carter Administration regulatory agencies often
relied on qualitative analyses to demonstrate that a substance was toxic, but did not attempt to pro-
duce quantitative estimates of the risks associated with specific exposure levels.
26. See id. at 19-20; The Odds on Cancer: EPA's Recent Bets, 218 SCIENCE 976 (1982). For a
specific example, see EPA Standards for Radon-222 Emissions from Licensed Uranium Mill Tail-
ings, 51 Fed. Reg. 34,056, 34,057 (1986).
27. One caveat is necessary about the illustrations presented below. Each regulatory proceeding
on toxic substances must address many complex scientific issues and requires analysis of great quanti-
ties of evidence. I believe useful evaluations of regulatory strategies cannot be performed without
careful attention to specific factual circumstances and decisionmaking constraints. In other words,
details matter and may often prove decisive. I have, for example, criticized some of the leading aca-
demics in the field of environmental law for advocating idealized theoretical approaches that under-
emphasize scientific uncertainties and practical implementation constraints on environmental regula-
tion. See Latin, supra note 11, at 1273-1304, 1329-32. Yet, an extended discussion of risk-assessment
problems and scientific data may submerge thematic points in a welter of technicalities. I have tried in
this Article to attain a middle ground that neither oversimplifies difficult issues nor exhausts most
readers' endurance, but some people will likely feel I erred in one direction or the other.
28. See Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group, Scientific Bases for Identification of Potential
Carcinogens and Estimation of Risks, 44 Fed. Reg. 39,858 (1979) [hereinafter IRLG Guidelines].
29. See OSHA Generic Cancer Policy, 45 Fed. Reg. 5002 (1980); EPA National Emission Stan-
dards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Policy and Procedures for Identifying, Assessing, and Regulating
Airborne Substances Posing a Risk of Cancer, 44 Fed. Reg. 58,642 (1979). CPSC applied similar
risk-assessment principles in its decision to regulate urea-formaldehyde foam insulation, see CPSC
Ban of Urea-Formaldehyde Foam Insulation, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,366 (1982). The EPA generic policy
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OSHA noted that industry representatives in every proceeding on toxic
substances had argued for the existence of a threshold exposure level
below which cancer risks are negligible.30 The IRLG guidelines and
OSHA generic cancer policy found this contention was unproven and
implausible in biological terms. The agencies instead adopted a protective
nonthreshold causation theory in recognition of continuing scientific
uncertainty.3  In the absence of any fundamental advance in the state of
scientific understanding, OSHA and other IRLG agencies concluded that
there was little reason to debate the threshold-level issue for every poten-
tial carcinogen.
Despite the Reagan Administration's generally dismal record on toxic
substance regulation,3" EPA's carcinogen guidelines may be examined at
face value as an attempt to improve the quality and consistency of risk
assessments. The specified practices usually conform to recommendations
made by politically independent scientific organizations; the guidelines
were widely reviewed by outside scientists; and in some instances the
guidelines adopt conservative treatments similar to those in the IRLG
guidelines.33 There has, however, been a subtle but important shift in
emphasis. Although the current guidelines are intended to encourage some
degree of analytical consistency, EPA experts must now assess risks inde-
pendently on the "weight of evidence" for each substance under review.
The guidelines make clear that:
[Rlisk assessments will be conducted on a case-by-case basis, giv-
ing full consideration to all relevant scientific information. This case-
by-case approach means that Agency experts review the scientific
information on each agent and use the most scientifically appropriate
interpretation to assess risk. 4
cited here was proposed under the Carter Administration but was not adopted in final form by the
Reagan Administration. The OSHA generic policy was formally adopted in 1980, but was subse-
quently ignored by agency staff under the new administration.
30. See OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Standards, 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5929 (1978).
31. See id. at 5946-47; OSHA Generic Cancer Policy, 45 Fed. Reg. 5002, 5023-24, 5131 (1980);
IRLG Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. 39,858, 39,872-75 (1979).
32. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 25; Latin, supra note 11, at 1309, 1324-29; Ashford, Ryan &
Caldart, A Hard Look at Federal Regulation of Formaldehyde: A Departure from Reasoned Deci-
sionmaking, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. Rev. 297, 298-99, 330-31 (1983); Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power:
Office of Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking
Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1 (1984).
33. See INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, 29 IARC MONOGRAPHS ON THE
EVALUATION OF THE CARCINOGENIC RISK OF CHEMICALS TO HUMANS, SupP. 4 (1982); NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1; NATIONAl. TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc
PANEL ON CHEMICAl. CARCINOGENESIS TESTING AND EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL ToxICOL-
OGY PROGRAM (1984); Office of Science and Technology Policy, Chemical Carcinogens: Review of
the Science and Its Associated Principles, 50 Fed. Reg. 10,372 (1985).
34. EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992 (1986); see Albert, supra note 1, at
312-13.
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The "weight of evidence" approach requires "an overall, balanced
judgment of the totality of the available evidence" 35 that "should be dealt
with on an individual basis." 6 This regulatory philosophy implies that
risk assessors must examine any potentially relevant scientific theories and
data that any party may choose to submit.37 The guidelines never consider
additional decisionmaking and administrative costs, regulatory delays, and
opportunities for obstructive private behavior that may arise from imple-
mentation of this individualized "weight of evidence" treatment. It is fair
to say that, in comparison with the IRLG approach, EPA now places
considerably more stress on attempts to ground regulatory decisions on
"good science" than on the need to provide effective pollution control
under conditions of scientific uncertainty. Consider the following
examples:
A. Competing Extrapolative Models
EPA's carcinogen guidelines follow the widely held view that "risks at
low exposure levels cannot be measured directly either by animal experi-
ments or by epidemiologic studies."38 Analysts must therefore extrapolate
from observed effects at high dosages to predicted risks at low exposure
levels. They also must frequently extrapolate from results in high-dosage
animal tests to animal risks and long-term human hazards at significantly
lower doses. Scientists have developed a number of competing extrapola-
tive models during the past two decades, but none has yet achieved general
acceptance.39 Although all of the models fit the observed high-dosage data
reasonably well, their estimates of low-dosage hazards can vary by several
orders of magnitude."' EPA's guidelines candidly acknowledge: "Good-
ness-of-fit to the [high-dose] experimental observations is not an effective
means of discriminating among models." 41 In other words, there is usually
35. EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,996 (1986).
36. Id. at 33,995; see also id. at 33,996-98, 34,001.
37. This individualized consideration specifically includes scientific claims on the threshold-level
issue that would have been rejected by IRLG and OSHA. See infra text accompanying notes 43-52,
199-202.
38. EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,997 (1986); see also Albert, supra note
1, at 316.
39. For general discussions of competing extrapolative models, see OSHA Generic Cancer Policy,
45 Fed. Reg. 5002, 5184-88 (1980); CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF HEALTH SERVS., REPORT TO THE SCI-
ENTIFIC REVIEW PANEL ON BENZENE: PART B-HEALTH EFFECTS OF BENZENE 68-80 (Nov. 1984)
[hereinafter DHS BENZENE REPORT]; ENVIRON CORP., ELEMENTS OF TOxICOLOGY AND CHEMI-
CAL RISK ASSESSMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR NONSCIENTISTS, AITORNEYS AND DECISION MAKERS
37-41 (1986).
40. See EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,997 (1986); Latin, supra note 5, at
371; Luken & Miller, The Benefits and Costs of Regulating Benzene, 31 J. AIR POLLUTION CON-
TROL ASS'N 1254, 1256-57 (1981).
41. EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,998 (1986).
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no reliable experimental basis for selecting one extrapolative model over
another.42 Dr. Peter Preuss, the present director of EPA's Office of
Health and Environmental Assessment, observed in 1985:
Until recently, risk assessments by Federal agencies generally uti-
lized simple linear models which predicted that cancer risks were in
direct proportion to the dose of carcinogen received; this uncompli-
cated methodology underscored the imprecise nature of risk calcula-
tions. Today, Federal agencies generally use complicated model-
fitting computer programs in most calculations. The statistical tech-
niques in these calculations are sophisticated and can be so involved
that risk assessors themselves do not fully understand the details.
The use of computerized models has led to some improvements in
risk predictions, particularly in situations where the linear model
does not fit experimental tumor data well. However, the fundamen-
tal uncertainties arising from extrapolations between experimental
animals and humans and from high doses to low have not signifi-
cantly decreased."3
The IRLG agencies adopted a "one-hit" linear extrapolative theory
that assumed the absence of safe threshold levels; they did not, however,
choose this approach simply because it was an "uncomplicated methodol-
ogy." The linear one-hit model is the most conservative credible theory in
the sense that it generates the highest risk estimates at low exposure
levels. In an explicit policy judgment made in response to persistent
uncertainties, the Carter Administration agencies chose to maximize safety
at the possible cost of overly stringent regulation by adopting the most
protective extrapolative model with significant support in the scientific
community."
The EPA guidelines recommend adoption of a linearized multistage
model in most carcinogenic risk assessments.45 This extrapolative theory is
quite conservative and produces risk estimates at low exposure levels simi-
lar, though not usually equal, to the results of the one-hit linear model."
42. See id. at 34,003; ENVIRON CORP., supra note 39, at 39.
43. Preuss & White, The Changing Role of Risk Assessment in Federal Regulation, 19 BAN-
BURY REPORT, RISK QUANTITATION AND REGULATORY POLICY, 331, 335 (D. Hoel, R. Merrill &
F. Perera eds. 1985) (emphasis added). At the time of this statement, Dr. Preuss was a senior scientist
with the Consumer Product Safety Commission. EPA's Office of Health and Environmental Assess-
ment is the division with primary responsibility for the Agency's choice of risk-assessment principles
and for the conduct of most assessments.
44. See, e.g., OSHA Generic Cancer Policy, 45 Fed. Reg. 5002, 5023-24 (1980); OSHA Occupa-
tional Exposure to Benzene, 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5946-47 (1978).
45. See EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,997-98 (1986).
46. See ENVIRON CORP., supra note 39, at 40; Comments in 19 BANBURY REPORT, RISK
QUANTITATION AN[) REGULATORY POLICY, 324, 327-28 (D. Hoel, R. Merrill & F. Perera eds.
1985).
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EPA selected the multistage model on the grounds that it provides a better
fit with the available experimental evidence than the one-hit model and
also appears more compatible with current knowledge about some biologi-
cal processes related to cancer causation.4 Thus, the Agency adopted a
protective, but not worst-case, extrapolative theory because it considers the
multistage model most plausible based on the present state of scientific
understanding. It is not, however, apparent why the Agency should prefer
marginally greater scientific plausibility to marginally greater public pro-
tection given EPA's recognition that no extrapolative model is demonstra-
bly correct and that goodness-of-fit for high-dose results does not prove a
model's value in predicting low-dose effects.48 The multistage theory may
be tenable science in light of our imperfect knowledge about carcinogene-
sis mechanisms,"9 but EPA's selection of this provisional extrapolative
model in pursuit of "good science" represents an implicit social policy
judgment.
Moreover, the guidelines make clear that the linearized multistage
model is a default methodology to be used "[i]n the absence of adequate
information to the contrary."5 Agency experts or regulated parties may
now argue for adoption of competing models on the basis of individualized
circumstances.5 The guidelines provide no selection criteria for competing
extrapolative theories in specific circumstances, and simply state: "When a
different model is chosen, the risk assessment should clearly discuss the
nature and weight of evidence that led to the choice."'5 2 This treatment
gives broad, if not unlimited, discretion to Agency analysts and encourages
regulated parties to present any extrapolative theories and data that sup-
port the outcome they desire.
B. Aggregation of Benign and Malignant Tumors
The current guidelines indicate: "Benign tumors should generally be
combined with malignant tumors for risk estimates unless the benign
tumors are not considered to have the potential to progress to the associ-
47. See DHS BENZENE REPORr, supra note 39, at 79-80; Albert, supra note 1, at 316.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
49. See EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,997 (1986). "At present, mecha-
nisms of the carcinogenesis process are largely unknown and data are generally limited." Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 33,997-98, 34,003; Albert, supra note 1, at 316-17.
52. EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,998 (1986). Individualized circum-
stances may be established by longitudinal dose-response data, pharmacokinetic and metabolism data,
or "other substantial evidence on the mechanistic aspects of the carcinogenesis process." Id. The pas-
sage continues: "Considerable uncertainty will remain concerning response at low doses; therefore, in
most cases an upper-limit risk estimate using the linearized multistage procedure should also be
presented." Id. There is no indication in the guidelines of which circumstances would justify omission
of an estimate derived from the multistage model.
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ated malignancies of the same histogenic origin. '"" Unlike under the prior
IRLG practice, toxic dischargers can now argue that the "weight of evi-
dence" demonstrates particular benign tumors are not related to the onset
of malignancy. When Dr. Roy Albert, the Chair of EPA's Carcinogen
Guideline Committee and Carcinogen Assessment Group (CAG), was
asked to describe the circumstances under which such an exception might
be appropriate, he conceded: "I doubt if there is any persuasive rationale
to exclude benign tumors. Benign tumors may represent the weak action
of a carcinogen or be a signal that the agent is a promoter." '54 EPA con-
tends that its treatment "allows flexibility in evaluating the data base for
each agent,"55 but the guidelines offer no criteria that would constrain
exclusion of benign tumors.56 In return for a possibly chimerical attempt
to ensure the best scientific assessment in any circumstances, this individu-
alized exception may increase the costs of the risk-assessment process and
is likely to facilitate submissions intended to delay regulation.
C. Negative Epidemiological Studies
Industry typically submits epidemiological studies that purport to
demonstrate no significant hazard at the low exposure levels currently
prevalent in most toxic contexts. The IRLG agencies consistently rejected
this type of evidence on the grounds that no level of exposure to a known
carcinogen could be entirely safe, and that the negative studies invariably
suffered from serious methodological deficiencies. 7 In its 1984 proceed-
ings on benzene emissions from coke by-product recovery plants, EPA
refused to accept negative epidemiological findings submitted by industry
for the same reasons that other agencies had previously rejected them.58
The Agency's current carcinogen guidelines, in contrast, provide:
It should be recognized that epidemiologic studies are inherently
capable of detecting only comparatively large increases in the relative
risk of cancer. Negative results from such studies cannot prove the
absence of carcinogenic action; however, negative results from a well-
designed and well-conducted epidemiologic study that contains usa-
ble exposure data can serve to define upper limits of risk; these are
53. Id. at 33,997.
54. Comments, supra note 46, at 324.
55. EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 34,002 (1986).
56. See id. Instead, the Agency stated generally that scientific issues should be addressed on their
individual merits in light of the available evidence. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
57. See Gulf S. Insulation v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 701 F.2d 1137, 1146 (5th Cir.
1983). See OSHA Identification, Classification and Regulation of Toxic Substances Posing a Potential
Occupational Carcinogenic Risk, 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148, 54,155-56 (1977); OSHA Occupational Expo-
sure to Benzene, 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5928-31, 5946 (1978);
58. EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,479, 23,484 (1984).
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useful if animal evidence indicates that the agent is potentially carci-
nogenic in humans."
Reliable negative epidemiologic data on carcinogenic risks will seldom
be available from "well-designed and well-conducted" studies. Many can-
cers entail latency periods of several decades, and the period may some-
times increase for smaller doses.6" Thus, accurate data must be available
from past years when exposures were frequently much higher than cur-
rently permissible and when exposure monitoring was typically casual at
best. Moreover, negative findings cannot be meaningful without a large
enough cohort to present a statistically valid sample, without accurate
exposure data for cohort members, without a reliable follow-up of subjects
who leave the place of employment or other cohort, and without accurate
determinations of the actual causes of death. These methodological charac-
teristics are extremely uncommon in long-term studies of human expo-
sures to chemical substances.61 Despite these barriers to implementation of
a "well-designed and well-conducted epidemiologic study," the EPA
guidelines allow industry to submit any negative studies in an attempt to
"define upper limits of risk" and consequently require Agency scientists in
each regulatory proceeding to examine those problematical studies in
detail.
D. Body-Site and Tumor-Type Specificity
The guidelines conservatively provide that "the biologically acceptable
data set from long-term animal studies showing the greatest sensitivity
should generally be given the greatest emphasis."62 However, they also
maintain that a "statistically significant excess of tumors of all types in the
aggregate, in the absence of a statistically significant increase of any indi-
vidual tumor type, should be regarded as minimal evidence of carcinogenic
action unless there are persuasive reasons to the contrary."63 To deter-
mine the overall risk, officials must add together all tumor types or sites
that appear at a significant level, but "quantitative risk extrapolations will
59. EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,995-96 (1986).
60. See OSHA Generic Cancer Policy, 45 Fed. Reg. 5002, 5040-41 (1980).
61. See, e.g., EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,479 (1984); Latin, supra note
5, at 361-65, 370 & n.257.
62. EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,997 (1986). The Agency selected this
protective treatment "(blecause it is possible that human sensitivity is as high as the most sensitive
responding animal species." Id. In contrast, some scientists contend that results from all relevant
animal studies should be averaged. See Comments, supra note 46, at 325-26. As usual, the EPA
guidelines direct that data from the most sensitive species should be used "in the absence of evidence
to the contrary," without specifying what that individualized evidence might be. EPA Carcinogen
Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,997 (1986).
63. EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,995 (1986).
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generally not be done on the basis of totals that include tumor sites with-
out statistically significant elevations.""' In other words, contrary to the
prior IRLG treatment,65 EPA ordinarily will require proof of a statisti-
cally significant number of specific tumors in specific organs or body loca-
tions. A statistically significant total of tumors of varying types in varying
locations normally will not be deemed a sufficient basis for regulation.
There is a tenable scientific rationale for this treatment 6 but it is not
necessarily mandated by good science. At a recent conference on risk
assessment, one scientist critical of EPA's current practice noted that some
carcinogenic agents are "just not very organ-specific. '6 7 Dr. Albert
defended the Agency treatment as "an attempt at a middle-of-the-road
position."6 8 EPA has never explained why a "middle" position is
desirable on a safety issue where the Agency acknowledges the absence of
a clear scientific consensus.69 EPA's selection of a mid-range position on
this issue reflects an implicit social policy choice that is not required by
the norms of good science and that cannot be resolved solely on the basis
of scientific judgments.
E. Extrapolation from Animal Test Dosages
Reliable epidemiologic data on long-term human risks cannot exist for
recently introduced toxic substances and is rarely available for chemicals
in longstanding use. Thus, most attempts to regulate toxic hazards must
rely on extrapolation of human risks from animal test data. Because
rodents and most other experimental subjects have much smaller bodies
than humans, risk assessors must adopt an "interspecies scaling factor" to
link test dosages with corresponding human exposures. EPA's carcinogen
guidelines only briefly explain its treatment of this issue:
The usual approach for making interspecies comparisons has been to
use standardized scaling factors. Commonly employed standardized
dosage scales include mg per kg body weight per day, ppm in the
diet or water, mg per m2 body surface area per day, and mg per kg
64. Id. at 33,997; see also id. at 34,003.
65. See Ashford, Ryan & Caldart, supra note 32, at 298-99, 330-31; Latin, supra note 11, at
1325, 1328.
66. See the observations of Drs. Albert, Purchase, and Weinstein in Comments, supra note 46, at
324-25. Inclusion of all observed tumors may lead to overestimation of risks if some result from
background cancer rates or other causes unrelated to the toxic exposures under review. On the other
hand, toxic risks may be underestimated if some cancers detected in animal tests or epidemiologic data
are excluded despite a statistically significant incidence of total tumors.
67. Id. at 324 (comments of Dr. Weinstein); see also id. at 324-25.
68. Id. at 325.
69. See id. (comments of Dr. Albert) ("It is perfectly clear that here, in this meeting, we have
views that range from describing this sort of evidence as 'poor' to others as 'not so bad'.").
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body weight per lifetime. In the absence of comparative toxicological,
physiological, metabolic, and pharmacokinetic data for a given sus-
pect carcinogen, the Agency takes the position that the extrapolation
on the basis of surface area is considered to be appropriate because
certain pharmacological effects commonly scale according to surface
area.70
This provision indicates that Agency risk assessors must consider the
individualized scientific evidence associated with each toxic substance
before selecting an interspecies scaling factor. The guidelines never
examine the impacts of this treatment on Agency decisionmaking costs and
on the ability of affected parties to challenge the scientific bases for risk
estimates derived from animal studies.
Moreover, EPA chose its "default" scaling factor on the ground that
"certain pharmacological effects commonly scale according to surface
area," but the Agency made no attempt to show that those effects bear a
reasonable relationship to any carcinogenesis process or that a scientific
consensus supports this approach. The significance of this default treat-
ment may be put in perspective by considering alternative estimates
presented in a California Department of Health Services (DHS) study of
animal test data on benzene-related risks."'
TABLE 1
Interspecies Scaling Factor Human Risk Per PPB
mg/kg of body wt. per day 14 X 10-6
mg/body surface area per day 170 X 10-6
mg/kg of body wt. per lifetime 580 X 10-6
DHS offered these benzene risk estimates only "for illustrative pur-
poses" because "no study has been explicitly undertaken with the objective
of determining what unit best expresses equivalence of carcinogenic
potency across mammalian species. "72 The Agency then followed EPA's
choice of the "middle of the range" surface-area criterion. 73 Absent any
discussion of the relationship between "certain pharmacological
effects" and carcinogenesis processes, it is unclear whether EPA selected
the body-surface-area criterion because it represents the best available
current science or because it leads to a mid-range assessment of toxic
70. EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,998 (1986) (citations omitted).
71. DHS used data from studies of male mouse preputial gland cancers to calculate the human
benzene risks presented in the accompanying table. DHS BENZENE REPORT, supra note 39, at 106.
72. Id. at 68.
73. Id.
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risks. The choice of scaling factor may produce risk estimates varying by
more than an order of magnitude and yet EPA has never explained why
its mid-range default position is appropriate under conditions of scientific
uncertainty.
The discussions above are not intended to suggest that regulatory agen-
cies should always provide the greatest conceivable degree of protection
against toxic risks under conditions of uncertainty. Rather, they demon-
strate that EPA's carcinogen guidelines contain numerous treatments that
are not compelled by generally accepted norms of risk-assessment science
and that have policy implications which cannot be evaluated purely in
scientific terms. Whether the likely ramifications from EPA's pursuit of
"good science" constitute a serious problem depends on how reliable cur-
rent risk-assessment practices really are, for few people would object to
basing regulatory judgments on accurate analyses of toxic hazards. A
more detailed description of the scientific uncertainties that arose in a spe-
cific risk-assessment proceeding may be useful to show how tenuous, one
might even say flimsy, is the technical evidence on which major pollution
control actions (or inaction) are often grounded.
II. EPA Analyses of Benzene Risks
This Part of the Article presents an extended description of scientific
issues raised in EPA's 1979 and 1984 regulatory proceedings on benzene,
one of the most common toxic substances found in the workplace and
ambient environment. Indeed, it is probably the most widely used indus-
trial chemical for which a carcinogenic causal relationship has been
clearly demonstrated. Benzene has consequently been the subject of
numerous proceedings by EPA, OSHA, CPSC, and state air pollution
control authorities. The following discussion of EPA's regulatory decisions
does not attempt to examine all, or even a majority, of the technical issues
and uncertainties presented in benzene proceedings, but it nonetheless
cites many complex and often tedious details that regulators inevitably
must confront. Before turning to specific scientific issues, it is necessary to
explain briefly why familiarity with the details of actual risk-assessment
practices is essential for the development of effective legal and social poli-
cies in this field.
A. The Need for Particularized Implementation Analyses
Most treatments of risk-assessment issues in the legal literature are
highly conceptual and are dominated by regulatory paradigms rather
than insights drawn from regulatory practice. These legal or policy-
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oriented discussions generally contend that perfect safety is unattainable,74
that agency decisionmakers should balance numerous incompatible and
often incommensurable criteria to reach the most efficient possible out-
come, 75 and that it is essential for regulators to "ask the right questions"
despite the presence of scientific uncertainty. 6 In contrast to these abstract
generalizations, I believe useful analyses of risk-assessment practices
require a realistic consideration of implementation constraints, adminis-
trative costs, and bureaucratic incentives associated with regulation in a
field where dispositive answers are seldom available. I have previously
noted, for example, that a typical consequence of requiring regulators to
address currently unanswerable scientific questions is agency paralysis,
not improved decisionmaking. 7
In response to my emphasis on implementation problems, Bruce Acker-
man and Richard Stewart contended that environmental regulation must
be made more efficient by adopting a "pollution-based" cost-effectiveness
approach that "would encourage a more focused discussion of whether the
goals set for different pollutants reflect sensible priorities. "78 They then
continued:
Indeed, it is not fanciful to suppose that a risk portfolio strategy
eventually might emerge that would explicitly attempt to rank the
comparative risks confronted by an EPA or an OSHA and then use
cost-effectiveness analysis to determine how available administrative
and control resources might best be devoted to minimizing overall
risk in a given time period. Such a strategy need not be limited to
conventional air and water pollutants. It could also be used, for
example, to manage the risks posed by pesticides, chemicals, or haz-
ardous wastes.79
The footnote to this passage further claimed that, to reduce administra-
tive burdens, "a 'mutual fund' variant of the portfolio approach might be
used, where appropriate, to control related pollutants through permits
74. See, e.g., M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982); Huber, Safety and
the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277
(1985); Pedersen, Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1059 (1981).
75. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR, 79-103 (1981); D. CUR-
RIE, AIR POI.LUTION: FEDERAL LAW AND ANALYSIS §§ 7.13, 10.01 (1981); Krier, The Irrational
National Air Quality Standards: Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. REV. 323, 324-30
(1974).
76. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 75, at 103; Ackerman & Stewart,
Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1357 (1985).
77. See Latin, supra note 11, at 1281-84, 1329-30.
78. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 76, at 1360.
79. Id. at 1360-61 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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based on a weighted average of volume and risk."8 Implementation of
these proposals, which I regard as not merely "fanciful" but fantastic,
would clearly require a sophisticated capability for reliable risk assess-
ments. Regulators could hardly trade the risks posed by one toxic sub-
stance against the risks from other toxics in the "portfolio" unless they
can ascertain the relative hazards with reasonable confidence. Professors
Ackerman and Stewart minimized the significance of scientific uncertainty
by claiming that I "underestimate the amount of information which does
exist, but which is ignored by regulators who refuse to confront ecological
and economic realities."81 As support for this claim, they cited recent deci-
sions by EPA not to regulate "acrylonitrile and other toxic emissions...
when analysis suggested that the risks involved were relatively low com-
pared to the more serious problems posed by chromium emissions-which
it did decide to regulate."8" Ackerman and Stewart contended these
"examples show that it is feasible to do a better job of goal-setting-by
introducing cost-effectiveness considerations in evaluating control options
for different risks and setting priorities more intelligently."83
This "proof" is unpersuasive because it assumes as a given that EPA's
risk assessments were accurate and that the magnitude of the "less seri-
ous" risks did not warrant regulation. The bare fact that EPA decided to
regulate one substance but not others cannot support a conclusion that the
Agency's decisions were reliable from the perspective of science or efficient
from the perspective of social policy. Certainly, agencies must set regula-
tory priorities in some manner, but this truism does not suggest that cur-
rent risk assessment practices fairly reflect prevailing social and political
values. I believe Ackerman and Stewart's contention that EPA did a "bet-
ter job of goal-setting" and acted "more intelligently" in the regulatory
contexts they cited was not grounded on a careful analysis of specific risk
assessments, but was only wishful thinking used to justify their idealized
conceptualizations. The critical risk-assessment issues-whether current
treatments yield reasonably accurate risk estimates and whether agency
practices implicitly incorporate controversial social policy judgments con-
cealed beneath a veneer of "good science"-cannot be resolved in the
abstract. Rather, a careful examination of actual risk-assessment practices
is essential for the selection of effective regulatory approaches.
EPA proceedings on benzene examined much more scientific and medi-
cal evidence than was available for acrylonitrile and the other chemicals
80. Id. at 1360 n.62.
81. Id. at 1363 (emphasis in original).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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cited by Ackerman and Stewart. Indeed, I chose to review EPA's treat-
ment of benzene risks largely because of the relative "abundance" of sci-
entific information and the relative "depth" of the Agency's considera-
tions.84 Moreover, the analytical practices adopted in the benzene
proceedings are very similar to the risk-assessment principles later incor-
porated in EPA's carcinogen guidelines. Although each regulatory analy-
sis of toxic hazards must be evaluated on its individual merits, there is
little doubt that most of the problems described below were equally or
more severe in the EPA risk assessments uncritically accepted by Acker-
man and Stewart.
I have tried to keep as succinct as possible my discussions of scientific
issues raised in EPA's benzene proceedings; yet, considerable detail is
essential because descriptions of actual regulatory problems are the only
antidote to the blithe conceptualizations that pervade most legal analyses
of risk-assessment issues. Because some readers will find this level of par-
ticularity burdensome, while others will appreciate specific details, it may
be useful to list in advance the principal observations documented below:
1. Different regulatory agencies adopted different risk-assessment
principles, relied on different types of scientific evidence, and reached
different conclusions about the extent of benzene-related health
hazards.
2. Despite widespread use of benzene for decades and ample evi-
dence that the substance is carcinogenic, there was little available
data on the hazards associated with specific exposure levels.
3. Risk assessors adopted conservative positions on some issues but
employed best-current-guess, mid-range, or methodological-
convenience treatments on other important issues. EPA presented no
explanations for these disparate treatments of scientific uncertainty.
4. On many risk-assessment issues, EPA acknowledged that no
scientific consensus exists and that the principal uncertainties cannot
be resolved in anything approaching a reliable manner.
5. EPA frequently dismissed material uncertainties by pairing dis-
cussions of indeterminate factors that could lead to overestimation
and underestimation of possible hazards, with no attempt to compare
the relative significance of those ostensibly offsetting factors.
6. EPA and other agencies often presented risk estimates with an
implausible degree of apparent precision. They did not, however,
agree on how estimated risks should be described: Some assessments
presented the risks as discrete point estimates, while others cited
ranges of possible risks at varying exposure levels.
84. 1 also had the advantage of familiarity with many of the relevant technical issues because I
previously evaluated OSHA's attempt to regulate benzene as an occupational health hazard. See
Latin, supra note 5.
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7. Industry representatives submitted the same debatable scientific
interpretations and unvalidated data in each benzene proceeding, but
EPA and other agencies seldom explicitly considered the decision-
making costs and regulatory delays imposed by individualized con-
siderations of repetitive arguments and evidence.
Readers who are prepared to accept these observations and who would
find a detailed analysis of diverse scientific issues unproductive may prefer
to read only subsection E in this Part and then the more general discus-
sions of problems raised by EPA's current "good science" approach and of
potentially applicable social policies in Parts III and IV.
B. EPA's Reliance on Epidemiologic Data to Derive a Unit Risk Factor
for Benzene
In 1978 OSHA regulated benzene as an occupational carcinogen but
decided there was insufficient evidence to identify specific benzene risks at
varying exposure levels.85 OSHA never produced a quantitative risk
assessment because it found the epidemiologic data were not accompanied
by accurate exposure measurements and because it questioned the reliabil-
ity of existing scientific models for extrapolation from data on high-dose
effects to predictions about low-dose risks."6 In an explicit social policy
judgment, OSHA concluded that it should not wait for scientific cer-
tainty 7 while hundreds of thousands of workers were exposed to benzene
levels that could feasibly be reduced. 8
EPA, in contrast, has twice produced quantitative estimates of the envi-
ronmental risks from benzene discharges. Based on a 1979 analysis by its
Carcinogen Assessment Group (CAG), EPA proposed to regulate emis-
85. In 1969 benzene dischargers adopted by industry consensus an occupational exposure limit of
10 parts per million (ppm) in response to evidence that benzene causes nonmalignant blood-disorders.
OSHA accepted this 10 ppm permissible exposure limit (PEL) in a 1971 national consensus standard.
During the next few years, OSHA accumulated epidemiologic evidence from several studies showing
that benzene causes leukemia. Based on evidence of excess leukemia deaths resulting from high or
unknown historical exposures, the Agency made a qualitative determination that benzene is an occu-
pational carcinogen. The Agency then attempted in 1978 to reduce the PEL from 10 ppm to I ppm.
See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 617-28 (1980);
OSHA Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5921-25 (1978); Latin, supra note 5,
at 344-46. This regulatory standard was invalidated by the Supreme Court on the ground that
OSHA had failed to prove prevailing exposure levels pose a "significant" risk of harm. See Industrial
Union, 448 U.S. at 607. For a brief discussion of this judicial treatment, see infra text accompanying
notes 210-22.
86. See Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 635-36; Latin, supra note 5, at 359-71; see also OSHA
Generic Cancer Policy, 45 Fed. Reg. 5002, 5196-200 (1980).
87. OSHA Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5920 (1978).
88. OSHA selected the 1 ppm PEL not because it was entirely safe, but because it was the lowest
discharge level for which emissions controls were technologically and economically feasible. See Indus-
trial Union, 448 U.S. at 621 & n.14, 650-51; Latin, supra note 5, at 644.
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sions from several categories of industrial sources.8 9 In 1984, EPA with-
drew all but one proposed standard on the ground that affected industries
had voluntarily reduced discharges to the point where residual risks were
no longer "significant." 9 The Agency did promulgate a revised standard
for emissions from coke by-product recovery plants after predicting the
following risks:
TABLE 2
EPA's 1984 Estimate of Leukemia Risks From
All Coke By-Product Recovery Plants91
Risks of Leukemia from Number of Exposed
Lifetime (70 years) Exposures People At Risk Within
To Benzene 20 km of Sources
I in 100 to I in 1,000 3,200
1 in 1,000 to 1 in 10,000 101,000
1 in 10,000 to 1 in 100,000 2,212,000
1 in 100,000 to 1 in 1,000,000 17,991,000
1 in 1,000,000 to 1 in 10,000,000 10,214,000
1 in 10,000,000 to 1 in 100,000,000 442,000
EPA derived these risk figures by multiplying the estimated lifetime
probability of leukemia for each part per million (ppm) of exposure by
the number of people exposed to different atmospheric benzene levels.
This mode of risk assessment entails three primary variables: the "unit
risk factor" or lifetime chance of contracting leukemia per dosage unit, the
ambient benzene concentrations surrounding each source, and the number
of people in proximity to the sources.92 Based on a predicted unit risk
89. See EPA National Emission Standard For Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions
From Maleic Anhydride Plants, 45 Fed. Reg. 26,659 (1980); EPA National Emissions Standards For
Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions From Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, 45 Fed. Reg.
83,447 (1980); EPA Benzene Emissions From Benzene Storage Vessels; National Emission Standard
for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 45 Fed. Reg. 83,591 (1980); EPA National Emission Standard for
Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Fugitive Emissions, 46 Fed. Reg. 1165 (1981); Cross, supra note
25, at 26-27. EPA eventually issued the proposed standard for fugitive benzene emissions, but the
Agency took that action only after a court order required it. See EPA National Emission Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Equipment Leaks (Fugitive Emission Sources), 40 C.F.R
§§61.110-.112 (1987).
90. See EPA Withdrawal of Proposed Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,558 (1984); EPA Benzene
Emissions from Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, and Benzene Storage Ves-
sels; Proposed Withdrawal of Proposed Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 8386 (1984). The Consumer Product
Safety Commission similarly withdrew its proposed benzene standard on the grounds that manufac-
turers had voluntarily chosen to eliminate most intentional uses of benzene in product designs. See
CPSC Benzene-Containing Consumer Products; Proposed Withdrawal of Proposed Rule, 46 Fed.
Reg. 3034 (1982). Thus, there is no applicable CPSC standard if manufacturers decide in the future
to increase the benzene content of their products.
91. EPA Proposed Standards for Benzene Emissions, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,522, 23,527 (1984).
92. See id. at 23,525-26; EPA National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Ben-
zene Emissions from Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, and Benzene Storage
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factor of 0.022 leukemias per ppm of benzene9" and on emissions monitor-
ing data from some coke by-product recovery plants, EPA concluded that
only 3200 people will be exposed to high concentrations subjecting them
to a lifetime leukemia risk of greater than one in a thousand. EPA esti-
mated that the annual incidence of benzene-induced leukemias for this
"most exposed population" group is 2.2 cases.94 Many millions of other
people are exposed to lower concentrations that entail estimated lifetime
risks of 10-" to 10- leukemias.95
The 1979 CAG analysis depended almost entirely on linear extrapola-
tions from epidemiologic data in three studies. Despite minor revisions of
CAG findings in response to criticisms submitted by industry, EPA's final
1984 estimates were grounded on the same data and analytical assump-
tions used by CAG in 1979. A review of the epidemiologic evidence dem-
onstrates that the data were insufficient to support reliable scientific con-
clusions and that the Agency adopted a number of debatable assumptions
to bridge the large analytical gaps.
1. The Aksoy Study
Based on studies at two hospitals in Istanbul, Dr. Aksoy and his associ-
ates concluded that workers in unventilated shoe and handbag manufac-
turing shops were subject to a risk of 13X 10- 5 leukemias in comparison
with a 6X 10 background risk for the general population.96 He identi-
fied 34 leukemia cases among 28,500 exposed workers, but this worker-
population figure was derived from rudimentary "official records" rather
than detailed industrial hygiene data. 97 Aksoy did not possess individual-
ized data on actual exposure levels. He assumed after a few sample mea-
surements that workers were exposed to maximum concentrations of 150
to 210 ppm and, because they often lived in their shops, to average con-
Vessels; Proposed Withdrawal of Proposed Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 8386, 8387 (1984); Albert, supra
note 1, at 317-19.
93. See EPA Proposed Standards for Benzene Emissions, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,522, 23,527 (1984).
94, Id.
95. See id. at 23,525-27; EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,489 (1984). I find
it surprising and unfortunate that EPA never presented a cumulative estimate of predicted benzene-
related fatalities for all exposed population groups.
96. See R. ALBERT, CARCINOGEN ASSESSMENT GROUP'S FINAL REPORT ON POPULATION RISK
TO AMBIENT BENZENE EXPOSURES 13c,14 (Jan. 10, 1979) [hereinafter CAG BENZENE REPORT].
Aksoy estimated the background lifetime leukemia risk as 6/100,000, but other experts submitted
estimates ranging from 14X 10 1 down to 3X101 cases. See EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg.
23,478, 23,483 (1984). The higher background risk figure would eliminate the statistical significance
of Aksoy's findings about benzene-induced effects, while adoption of the lower background estimate
would double the relative risk predicted by the CAG. Id.
97. CAG BENZENE REPORT, supra note 96, at 13; see also EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed.
Reg. 23,478, 23,483 (1984).
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centrations of 15 to 30 ppm outside of working hours.98 The CAG used
these tentative exposure estimates to calculate a unit risk factor of .020252
per ppm.99
The critical risk-assessment issue is not whether the Aksoy study sup-
ports a qualitative finding that benzene exposure causes excess leukemia
deaths-though industry disputed the study's utility even for that pur-
pose-but whether Aksoy's data were sufficient to derive a reliable dose-
response curve for low-level exposures. Virtually every quantitative esti-
mate and analytical assumption in the study was challenged in the scien-
tific literature or the regulatory proceedings.
For example, CAG used the geometric mean of Aksoy's high and low
exposure estimates (between 150-210 and 15-30 ppm) to derive an aver-
age of 63.6 ppm per working hour.' Yet, the International Agency for
Research on Cancer (IARC) reported that peak exposures had been
reported as high as 650 ppm. 1 ' Moreover, there was no assurance that
only 28,500 workers were exposed to benzene nor that all included work-
ers were subjected to relatively high emissions levels.' 2 Dr. Bernard
Goldstein, EPA's Assistant Administrator for Research and Development,
noted that Aksoy's "scanty exposure data" consisted only "of a few sam-
ples with no information as to how these samples may have typified the
average benzene exposure in the workplace."' 3
The IARC evaluation also noted that the type of cancer clearly associ-
ated with benzene exposure, acute non-lymphocytic leukemia, appeared
far more often in exposed workers than in the general population. IARC
concluded that if the incidence in Aksoy's data of this specific type of leu-
kemia, rather than all leukemias, had been used to compute the relative
risks from benzene exposure, the excess risk would be more than an order
of magnitude greater than the CAG prediction.1 0
In its 1984 explanation of the benzene standard, EPA acknowledged
the validity of several methodological criticisms that would decrease the
98. See CAG BENZENE REPORT, supra note 96, at 16.
99. See id. at 17. CAG based this conclusion on a lifetime average exposure estimate of 4.22 ppm,
which it derived using an average ten-hour working day and a 300-day working year. See id. at
16-17. This treatment may underestimate lifetime exposures, and hence overestimate the risk associ-
ated with lower emissions levels, because many of the workers were subject to continuing benzene
exposures in their shared working-living quarters. See Luken & Miller, supra note 40, at 1256.
100. See CAG BENZENE REPORT, supra note 96, at 16.
101. See INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, 29 IARC MONOGRAPHS ON
THE EVALUATION OF THE CARCINOGENIC RISK OF CHEMICALS TO HUMANS 121 (1982) [hereinafter
IARC BENZENE STUDY].
102. See id.; EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,483 (1984).
103. See Goldstein, Risk Assessment and Risk Management of Benzene by the Environmental
Protection Agency, 19 BANBURY REPORT, RISK QUANTITATION AND REGULATORY POLICY, 293,
295 (D. Hoel, R. Merrill & F. Perera eds. 1985).
104. See IARC BENZENE STUDY, supra note 101, at 122.
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predicted levels of risk in Aksoy's findings. The Agency observed: "It is
equally likely, however, that Aksoy's methodology leads to an underesti-
mate of the excess risk."' 05 EPA then summarized several plausible criti-
cisms that would increase the estimate of possible risks, but the Agency
made no attempt to assess the magnitude of these conflicting sets of criti-
cisms. Instead, it apparently hoped that overestimated and underestimated
risk factors would somehow counterbalance each other, a treatment hardly
consistent with the practice of reliable science. Given the numerous uncer-
tainties underlying the Aksoy data and the CAG analysis, EPA's presen-
tation of the predicted .020252/ppm unit risk factor to a precision of six
decimal places was inherently misleading.1 °6
2. The Ott Study
Dr. Ott and his colleagues examined a cohort of 594 chemical manufac-
turing workers exposed to benzene between 1940 and 1973. They identi-
fied three cases of leukemia compared to an expected level of 0.8, which
represents an excess risk of 3.75.07 CAG used Ott's exposure and risk
estimates to derive a unit risk factor of .04638/ppm of benzene10 8 EPA's
reliance on the Ott study has been criticized on several grounds:
CAG characterized Ott's finding of three leukemias in 594 workers as
of "borderline statistical significance."1 9 EPA nonetheless relied on Ott's
data in 1984 because it was the only study that involved relatively low
levels of benzene exposure.110
GAG accepted Ott's attempt to estimate exposures for different job cate-
gories "as accurately as the historical air monitoring data permitted.""'
Yet, these estimates were based on work history data and plant hygiene
measurement surveys, not on personalized records of benzene exposure." 2
IARC observed that "the number of workers in any particular work area
was limited, and the power of the study to detect any association between
exposure levels and cases was correspondingly low."11 3
Industry experts noted that one of the three identified leukemias had
105. Id.
106. See infra text accompanying notes 131-32, 162-84.
107. The excess risk was derived by dividing the observed incidence of 3 leukemias by the
expected incidence of 0.8. See EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,483 (1984); CAG
BENZENE REPORT, supra note 96, at 18.
108. See CAG BENZENE REPORT, supra note 96, at 19-20.
109. Id. at 18.
110. See EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,483 (1984); EPA Benzene Emis-
sions from Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, and Benzene Storage Vessels;
Proposed Withdrawal of Proposed Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 8386, 8388 (1984).
111. See CAG BENZENE REPORT, supra note 96, at 17.
112. See id. at 19; Goldstein, supra note 103, at 295-96.
113. IARC BENZENE STUDY, supra note 101, at 125.
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not been the cause of death, and then argued that this cancer should be
excluded from the total of excess mortality risks." 4 They also claimed that
some included workers had been exposed to other carcinogenic substances,
and therefore that the observed leukemias may not have been caused by
benzene." 5 Indeed, Ott eliminated 53 workers including one leukemia vic-
tim from the cohort because they had been exposed to other "confounding
exposures.""1 6 From the perspective of reliable science, it is obvious why a
study should exclude ambiguous results in the presence of confounding
variables. Given the limited scope of Ott's data, however, the effect of
disregarding one leukemia that may have been caused by benzene was to
reduce CAG's prediction of lifetime risks by nearly a third. This treat-
ment is not clearly appropriate as a matter of social policy under condi-
tions of continuing scientific uncertainty.
3. The Infante Study and Rinsky Follow-Up
The Infante study involved a retrospective cohort analysis of 748 work-
ers employed in two rubber hydrochloride factories between 1940 and
1949. After determining the status of about 75% of the cohort between
1950 and 1975, Infante identified nine cases of leukemia mortality in
comparison with an expected 1.25 leukemia deaths. 7 CAG interpreted
the Infante data to find a relative risk of 7.20 resulting from the cohort's
exposure to benzene,"" and then estimated the unit risk factor as .014854
per ppm.
119
Despite its reliance on the Infante study, CAG acknowledged several
problems with its data:
(1) [Tlhe authors essentially give no estimate of worker exposures
except to say that the levels were less than the prevailing recom-
mended occupational limits at the time various monitoring surveys
were made; (2) . . .Air monitoring information at [one of the two
plants] is almost non-existent, and therefore the exposure to half of
the members of the cohort is almost completely unknown . . . (3)
114. The Agency properly rejected this criticism on the ground that the tumor might have been
fatal if the subject had not died from other causes. See EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg.
23,478, 23,483 (1984).
115. See id.; Luken & Miller, supra note 40, at 1256.
116. See EPA Regulation of Benzene, 45 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,483 (1984); CAG BENZENE RE-
PORT, supra note 96, at 18.
117. See CAG BENZENE REPORT, supra note 96, at 8-10.
118. See id. at 10. The Agency produced this estimate by dividing the observed leukemia inci-
dence of 9 by the expected incidence of 1.25 cases.
119. See id. at 12-13.
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. . . [O]ver 400 workers known to be exposed to low benzene levels
[may have been] deliberately excluded from the cohort.12
Because knowledge of historical exposure levels is necessary before a
unit risk factor can be computed, CAG proceeded on the basis of one 1946
survey to "guess that the average exposure to all people in the plant
before 1946 is probably not much more than 100 ppm, and not less than
15 ppm."12 The Agency risk assessors also conceded: "Benzene levels
were monitored after 1946 at various plant locations but they were all
instantaneous samples and no reliable information is available about how
many man-hours were spent at these locations or whether protective
masks were worn." '22 CAG made "the assumption that the average
worker exposure was the same as the prevailing recommended occupa-
tional limits." '23 Despite the problematical nature of these several
assumptions and guesses, the Agency "felt that this study is the least
flawed of the three utilized."1 2 '
In its 1984 benzene proceeding, EPA reviewed a follow-up study by
Dr. Rinsky that extended coverage to 98% of the Infante cohort. This
study adopted a strict cohort definition that excluded four leukemia cases
which fell outside the job classifications or dates covered in the initial
study,125 but nonetheless found a statistically significant excess leukemia
risk present among workers at both plants. 26 Rinsky and other scientists
"for the most part" accepted Infante's contention that benzene exposures
usually fell within the recommended limits.127 After reviewing the availa-
ble exposure data, however, the EPA official responsible for research on
toxic effects emphasized:
[I]n dealing with a low incidence phenomenon, it is difficult to
utilize general industrial hygiene measurements as a means of typi-
fying individual exposure. In both the Infante and Ott cohorts, less
120. Id. at 9.
121. Id. at 10. The CAG assessment recognized that no emissions monitoring records were availa-
ble prior to 1946. Id.
122. Id. at 11.
123. Id. The Supreme Court plurality opinion in the benzene decision noted OSHA's finding that
exposures in some plants may have considerably exceeded the 10 ppm PEL during the 1970's. See
Industrial Union, Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 622 n.16 (1980). If
periodic violations of a legal standard occurred during a decade when concern for toxic hazards was
high, it is doubtful that most plants routinely complied with voluntary consensus standards in earlier
decades.
124. CAG BENZENE REPORT, supra note 96, at 9; see also EPA Withdrawal of Proposed Stan-
dards, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,558, 23,560 (1984).
125. See EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,482 (1984); IARC BENZENE
STUDY, supra note 101, at 125.
126. See IARC BENZENE STUDY, supra note 101, at 126.
127. See id. at 125-26; EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,482 (1984).
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than 1% of the total work force at risk developed leukemia. Accord-
ingly, it is questionable whether the reported exposure levels are
meaningful in estimating dose to the relatively few workers who
developed the leukemia.'28
Notwithstanding the problems with each epidemiological study, CAG
used the geometric mean of the unit risk factors from its interpretation of
the Aksoy, Ott, and Infante data to derive a predicted unit risk factor of
.024074 per ppm for benzene.' 29 This is the final, if magical, unit risk
factor the Agency used to calculate the particular risks posed by different
categories of benzene sources. In 1984 EPA reduced the CAG estimate
seven percent to .022, reflecting minor revisions in interpretation of two
studies, 3 ' but this revised unit risk factor was clearly based on the same
data and risk-assessment assumptions used in the 1979 CAG analysis.
It is necessary to stress that epidemiologic evidence may be suitable for
some quantitative purposes and not for others. With respect to the Infante
study, for example, EPA noted that uncertainty about historical exposure
levels is "irrelevant to the study's conclusion that exposed workers exper-
ienced a fivefold excess risk of leukemia over the general population."''
After acknowledging the limitations in Ott's data, EPA similarly argued
that this study "serves to reinforce the public health concerns regarding
benzene exposure."' 32 These comments indicate that the epidemiologic
evidence was sufficient to prove benzene exposure induces leukemia, but
EPA's characterizations do not demonstrate that the three studies could
enable identification of the risks posed by specific exposure levels. In
short, the conclusion that benzene is a carcinogen may be amply sup-
ported by data that are too indefinite to serve as the basis of a quantitative
risk assessment. OSHA had considered the same epidemiological studies
in detail and concluded that inadequate exposure data, small cohort size,
and other methodological shortcomings precluded derivation of meaningful
dose-response relationships for benzene risks.' 3
C. Pollutant Concentrations and Dispersion Patterns
EPA had to assess many issues other than the unit risk factor before
producing final estimates of the leukemia hazards created by benzene dis-
charges. Agency scientists employed emissions monitoring data and engi-
128. Goldstein, supra note 103, at 295-96.
129. See CAG BENZENE REPORT, supra note 96, at 20; Goldstein, supra note 103, at 296.
130. See EPA Proposed Standards for Benzene Emissions, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,522, 23,527 (1984).
131. EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,482 (1984).
132. Id. at 23,483.
133. See Latin, supra note 5, at 361-64, 370 n.257; supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
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neering estimates from specific plants, population distribution figures for
areas around those pollution sources, meteorological data, and complex
atmospheric dispersion models to predict the population exposed to varied
concentrations of benzene."" Most of these essential variables are subject
to considerable uncertainty.
There were, for example, fifty-five coke by-product recovery plants in
1984,1"5 and EPA consultants identified more than twenty distinct emis-
sion sources in each plant that may produce varied discharges depending
on individual plant designs.'" 6 It is not surprising the Agency acknow-
ledged that "emissions and plant parameters often must be estimated
rather than measured, particularly in determining the magnitude of fugi-
tive emissions and where there are large numbers of sources.'
'1 7
Estimation of ambient benzene concentrations depends on the atmos-
pheric dispersion pattern associated with each plant's emissions, which is
a function of localized meteorological conditions and terrain. Yet, suffi-
cient information on these variables is difficult and expensive to obtain in
practice. EPA conceded that "meteorological data often are not available
at the plant site but only from distant weather stations that may not be
representative of the meteorology of the plant vicinity.'
'138
EPA noted that its best atmospheric dispersion model "is usually too
resource intensive for modeling a large number of sources."' 39 To simplify
computational requirements, it relied on a dispersion model that excludes
any pollution effects outside a twenty kilometer radius of each source
"regardless of the estimated concentration at that point."'"4 The computer
model also assumed that the surrounding land is always flat. EPA recog-
nized that "[flor sources located in complex terrain, this assumption would
tend to underestimate the maximum annual concentration,"'" and might
understate ambient levels by "several fold."' 42
134. EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,492-93 (1984); see also EPA Draft
Environmental Impact Statement: Benzene Emissions from Coke By-Product Recovery
Plants-Background Information for Proposed Standards, Appendix E (May 1984) [hereinafter Ben-
zene Draft EIS].
135. See Goldstein, supra note 103, at 299.
136. See EPA Proposed Standards for Benzene Emissions, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,522, 23,527-28
(1984).
137. EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,493 (1984); see also EPA Withdrawal
of Proposed Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,558, 23,562 (1984).
138. EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,493 (1984).
139. Benzene Draft EIS, supra note 134, at E-15.
140. Id.
141. EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,493 (1984); see also id. at 23,492 nn.1
& 3.
142. Benzene Draft EIS, supra note 134, at E-15. The Agency also conceded that some of its
other computerized exposure-assessment "assumptions are simplifications. People rarely live in the
same place for 70 years; some move out and some move in. Nor do plants operate continuously for 70
years using the same equipment." EPA Proposed Standards for Benzene Emissions, 49 Fed. Reg.
23,522, 23,526 (1984).
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The Agency attempted to offset these scientific deficiencies by claiming
that other exposure-assessment factors may have been overestimated by an
unspecified amount. 4" Given the great number of uncertain risk-
assessment variables, EPA's frequent practice of presenting paired discus-
sions of factors that may induce overestimation and underestimation of
toxic risks can be used to rationalize any predictive judgment. Simply list-
ing countervailing factors without any indication of their relative
probability or importance does not reflect a systematic policy on how sci-
entific uncertainties should be resolved in regulatory proceedings.
EPA's treatments of pollutant dispersion and population exposures
were apparently shaped more by considerations of methodological con-
venience and resource constraints than by attempts to achieve the best pos-
sible science. The Agency's use of simplified analytical models cannot be
criticized simply because they fail to capture every relevant facet of com-
plex problems. Effective regulation may sometimes require agencies to
adopt crude but administrable decisionmaking strategies that do not incor-
porate a high degree of scientific sophistication.' 44 Yet, reliance on a range
of debatable assumptions and analytical simplifications calls into question
the overall scientific reliability of agency predictions. Complexity and
uncertainty in estimating pollutant concentrations and exposed popula-
tions compound the imprecision of estimated unit risk factors for toxic
substances.
D. Animal Studies of Benzene Effects
Reliable animal data on the carcinogenic effects of benzene were not
available when OSHA and CAG conducted their initial risk assess-
ments.' 45 Because EPA's 1984 regulatory analysis depended heavily on
the 1979 CAG assessment, the Agency did not rely on animal test data in
its quantitative derivation of the unit risk factor. Instead, EPA merely
cited the support of recent animal studies for its finding that benzene is a
potent carcinogen." In contrast, the California Air Resources Board and
Department of Health Services (DHS) evaluated the results of several
143. See Benzene Draft EIS, supra note 134, at E- 15; see also EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49
Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,493 (1984); EPA Proposed Standards for Benzene Emissions, 49 Fed. Reg.
23,522, 23,526 (1984).
144. See Latin, supra note 11, at 1279-84, 1296-97, 1310-32.
145. See OSHA Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5932, 5946 (1978); CAG
BFNZENE REPO'r, supra note 96, at 3.
146. See EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,484 (1984). CAG later conducted
a quantitative risk assessment using the geometric mean of test results from four animal studies to
derive a unit risk factor "almost identical" to its 1979 estimate based on human epidemiologic data.
Goldstein, supra note 103, at 296, 298. Indeed, Dr. Goldstein noted that the closeness of the two
estimates was "remarkable, perhaps even approaching witchcraft." Id. at 296.
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animal studies in their quantitative assessment of benzene risks.147 A brief
discussion of the DHS analysis may be useful because most assessments of
toxic risks depend heavily on extrapolation of human risks from animal
test data.
DHS reviewed the results from a series of animal studies conducted by
Dr. Maltoni and his associates and by the National Toxicology Program
(NTP).48 These studies unequivocally demonstrated that benzene "pro-
duces different types of tumors in different organs, and therefore it must
be considered a multipotential carcinogen."' 49 Based on cancer incidence
data from the Maltoni and NTP experiments, DHS identified a series of
possible human risks ranging between 20-340X10 - lifetime cancers per
ppm of benzene. 5 ' However, the DHS report noted several important
sources of uncertainty associated with basing risk estimates on the availa-
ble animal studies.
Most of the cancers detected in the Maltoni and NTP studies affected
the Zymbal glands of rats and the Zymbal and preputial glands of mice,
but neither of these organ sites has any close biological analogue in
human beings.' 5 ' The DHS staff adopted protective IRLG and IARC
positions that "it is appropriate to use the most sensitive species, sex, and
tumor site in its assessments because there is often little correlation
between tumor types or target organs between species which may in part
be due to both physiologic differences between species and differences in
the conditions of the bioassay and actual human exposure."' 52 This treat-
ment may be appropriate to establish that a substance is carcinogenic, but
it is much more problematic whether animal test data derived from differ-
ent organs and tumor types can be used to derive a reliable dose-response
curve and unit risk factor applicable to human beings.
Animal tests typically entail high doses administered over short periods
of time, but human hazards from toxic substances are usually character-
ized by long-term exposures to relatively low doses.' Application of high
dosages in animal studies presents several problems. For example, the
DHS report noted:
147. See DHS B.NZENE REPORT, supra note 39, at 34-126. The state agencies conducted an
extended assessment of benzene risks because the majority of atmospheric benzene emissions originate
from automobile exhausts and gas station operations, which are sources of special concern in Southern
California.
148. See id. at 84-99.
149. Id. at 89.
150. Id. at 99.
151. Id. at 89, 91; Goldstein, supra note 103, at 296.
152. DHS BENZENE REPORT, supra note 39, at 65.
153. See Latin, supra note 5, at 377-79.
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Due to the high cost of animal bioassays, studies are conducted
with relatively few animals (usually 50) per dose group. This results
in a very low statistical power to detect small increases in disease
rates. To compensate for this, high dose schedules are used. This
assumes that chemically induced carcinogenic responses at high doses
will also result in similar responses at low doses.""
In comparison to small test groups, a cohort of about 10,000 animals
would be required to detect a statistically significant risk of one in 100 at
realistic human dosage levels.' 55 Yet, high doses may affect carcinogenesis
processes and may distort low-dose-response calculations. DHS noted that
animals in both the NTP and Maltoni studies had "significant noncarci-
nogenic adverse toxicological responses" including "dose-related increased
mortalities and dose-related weight losses."' 56 These "chronic toxicological
insults from high doses of benzene" may have caused or contributed to the
observed incidence of cancers.' 57 DHS provisionally rejected this indirect
causal mechanism as unproven,'158 but the Agency noted that the level of
scientific knowledge is weak in this area.' 9
DHS observed that test results could be affected by "animals which die
during the 2-year course of the experiment either due to benzene toxicity
or due to natural causes, and thus are not available to develop cancer." '
In other words, high test doses could cause nonmalignant mortalities and
correspondingly reduce the apparent incidence of cancers in the study.
DHS indicated that an adjustment for premature mortality in test subjects
might produce up to a fourfold increase in the predicted unit risk factor,
but the Agency did not actually make this correction in its final assess-
ment of benzene risks. 6'
Because animal test data stem from high-dose exposures, a risk assess-
ment must employ an extrapolative theory to predict low-dose effects and
an interspecies scaling factor that relates animal doses to human expo-
sures. DHS considered numerous extrapolative theories that have been
proposed in the scientific literature and eventually followed EPA's choice
154. DHS BENZENE REPORT, supra note 39, at 66.
155. See Ames, Identifying Environmental Chemicals Causing Mutations and Cancer, 204
SCIENCE. 587, 589 (1979); Leape, supra note 6, at 93-94.
156. DHS BENZENE REPoRr, supra note 39, at 98.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 52, 54-55, 67, 98-99.
159. See id. at Al-A5.
160. Id. at 100.
161. See id. 100-101. The DHS report's failure to adjust its final risk estimates for animals that
died of nonmalignant causes during the studies may explain the discrepancy between its "high" esti-
mate in one passage of 340 X 10"6 /ppb, id. at 99, and another "high" estimate of 170 X 10"6 /ppb, id.
at 110. These estimates differ by a factor of two, and DHS noted that an adjustment for competing
causes of death could lead to higher risk level estimates. Id. at 100.
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of a multistage model.162 The state Agency, however, noted: "It is not
possible to validate any of these models in the low dose range with either
animal or epidemiologic data so selection of a particular model is some-
what arbitrary. '"163 DHS also observed that several different interspecies
scaling factors could be adopted before it selected the surface-area crite-
rion.164 DHS concluded that "the mg/surface area-day factor is most
appropriate because it falls near the middle of the range of measures that
have been proposed. ' '16 The Agency did not provide any scientific or
social policy explanation why a mid-range position is preferable to a con-
servative one. In justifying its choice of a protective extrapolative theory
for low-dose exposures, DHS contended that "the more conservative of
equally reasonable elements should constitute the basis for regulation.1 66
Yet DHS did not adopt an equivalent approach in its choice of an inter-
species scaling factor, nor explain the inconsistency in its treatments of
uncertainty.
This discussion only suggests the many scientific uncertainties that pre-
clude reliable derivation of human carcinogenic risks from animal test
results. In the recent Science symposium on risk assessment, three scien-
tists observed:
Quantitative extrapolation from rodents to humans, particularly at
low doses, is guesswork that we have no way of validating. It is
guesswork because of lack of knowledge in at least six major areas:
(i) the basic mechanisms of carcinogenicity; (ii) the relation of can-
cer, aging, and lifespan; (iii) the timing and order of the steps in the
carcinogenic process that are being accelerated; (iv) species differ-
ences in metabolism and pharmacokinetics; (v) species differences in
anticarcinogens and other defenses; and (vi) human heterogene-
ity-for example, pigmentation affects susceptibility to skin cancer
from ultraviolet light. These sources of uncertainty are so numerous,
and so substantial, that only empirical data will resolve them, and
little of this is available.167
The symposium article concluded "it is not scientifically credible to use
results from rodent tests done at [high doses] to directly estimate human
162. See id. at 68-80.
163. Id. at 69.
164. See id. at 68, 106; supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
165. DHS BENZENE REPORT, supra note 39, at 68.
166. CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BD. & DEP'T OF HEALTH SERVS., REPORT TO THE SCIEN-
TIFIC: REVIEW PANE. ON BENZENE: OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATION 8 (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter
DHS BENZENE OVERVIEW].
167. Ames, Magaw & Gold, Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards, 236 SCIENCE 271, 275
(1987) (citations omitted).
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risks at low doses."16 Yet, this is precisely the function of the risk-
assessment process, and the DHS benzene analysis relied heavily on
extrapolating human risks from animal test results.
DHS also reviewed more than a dozen epidemiological studies of ben-
zene effects including the three on which EPA relied. 69 The state report
noted the value of epidemiologic data for establishing that benzene is a
carcinogen, but then identified many weaknesses in the major studies."'
DHS nonetheless followed CAG's risk-assessment assumptions to calcu-
late a best-guess unit risk factor of 48X10-6 leukemia cases based on the
Rinsky reinterpretation of Infante's study, which was roughly double the
22X10 "6 EPA estimate derived from the geometric mean of the three
studies.' The DHS staff, however, chose to describe leukemia hazards as
a series of risk estimates ranging between EPA's low prediction and a
high estimate of 170X 10- per part per billion (ppb) arising from extra-
polation of animal test results.'12 In other words, DHS presented the
EPA estimate, its own estimate based on the Rinsky study, and several
other predictions derived from animal studies to identify a range of possi-
ble risk values that varied by a factor of about eight.'" 8
168. Id. at 277.
169. See DHS BENZENE REPORT, supra note 39, at 42-44.
170. DHS listed the following problems: "Exposure levels and exposure periods are poorly docu-
mented, mortality rather than incidence is reported, the number of exposed individuals tends to be
small, appropriate control groups are not always used, results are only directly applicable to white
employed males-effects in women and children have not been sufficiently studied, and few con-
founding factors are controlled for." Id. at 110. DHS also cited "the long latency period for the
development of human cancers, [and] the difficulty of identifying a large appropriate study popula-
tion" as reasons why "epidemiological studies are of limited usefulness as a means of carcinogen
identification." Id. at 33. After summarizing criticisms of the Aksoy, Ott, Infante, and Rinsky studies,
see id. at 57, 62-63, the DHS report noted:
Much of the criticism of the CAG risk assessment related directly to the quality of the
benzene exposure data; specifically, the exposure period and the exposure levels. For example,
the exposure period in the Rinsky study is taken to be 35 years, an estimate some consider to
be longer than the actual exposure time. The use of this exposure period has the effect of
increasing the cumulative exposure dose and hence yields a slope that is lower than the actual.
Further, since no routine monitoring of the work place was performed during the periods
workers in this study were exposed, much controversy has arisen as to the level of benzene
workers were exposed to. Here it is argued that [the] exposure level used for the assessment
substantially underestimated the true exposure level thereby resulting in an overestimate of the
slope.
Id. at 63.
171. See id. at 57-59, 114-15.
172. See id. at 108-11. In the sam vein, DHS stated that its analysis of the Rinsky data pro-
duced a risk estimate between 32X10 " and 120XI -6 , with 48X10"6 /ppb as the most likely unit
risk factor computed directly from Rinsky's study. Id. at 58-59, 114-15. The disparity of risk esti-
mates, unlike the one obtained by DHS from animal studies, was a function of statistical confidence
levels rather than a difference in risk-assessment assumptions. See id. at 59.
173. See id. at 108 (Figure 3). The Air Resources Board estimated that people in the southern
region of California are exposed to average concentrations of 4.6 ppb, and the Board then used the
range of DHS risk estimates to predict that benzene emissions would cause between 101 and 780
leukemia cases per million lifetime exposures. See DHS BENZENE OVERVIEW, supra note 166, at 8.
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As in EPA's carcinogen guidelines and benzene proceedings, the DHS
benzene assessment mixed conservative, best-current-guess, mid-range,
and methodological-convenience positions on various issues without any
thematic coherence. If DHS had selected a series of more conservative
treatments-for example, by adjusting for premature animal subject mor-
tality and by using the mg/kg-lifetime scaling factor and linear one-hit
extrapolative theory-the revised benzene risk estimate could have been
an order of magnitude or more greater than the predictions presented in
the state report. On the other hand, adoption of less conservative assess-
ment criteria might have led to an estimate of only negligible risks from
ambient levels of benzene. Because critical uncertainties cannot be re-
solved exclusively through reliable scientific judgments, the ultimate regu-
latory decisions must explicitly or implicitly incorporate policy judgments.
E. Inconsistent Treatments of Uncertainty
In its 1984 benzene proceedings, EPA multiplied the ambient concen-
tration and population estimates by the calculated unit risk factor to iden-
tify predicted leukemia hazards from five types of industrial sources.
TABLE 3
Estimated Leukemia Risks From Industrial Sources 7"
Category of Level of Maximum Lifetime Annual Leukemia
Benzene Emissions Risk/Most Exposed Incidence For Most
Discharger (Mg/year) Population Group Exposed Population
Coke By-
Products 24,100 6.4 X 10- 3  2.2
Fugitive
Emissions 7,900 1.5 X 10- 3  0.45
Benzene Storage
Vessels 620 3.6 X 10- 5  0.043
Maleic
Anhydride 960 7.6 X 10- 5  0.029
Ethylbenzene/
Styrene 210 1.4 X 10- 4  0.0057
174. The figures for all source categories except coke by-product recovery plants are presented in
Table I of EPA's explanation for its selective regulation of benzene dischargers. See EPA Regulation
of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,492 (1984). The other estimate is from EPA Proposed Standards
for Benzene Emissions, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,522, 23,525 (1984).
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In light of the uncertainties underlying toxic risk assessment, EPA's
estimates of .0057 cases per year-one leukemia every other cen-
tury-from ethylbenzene plants and of fewer than three cases per century
from maleic anhydride discharges are surely artifacts of the Agency's
arithmetic rather than scientifically credible figures. Nevertheless, these
risk-assessment estimates formed the foundation for EPA's decision to
promulgate standards for the first two categories while withdrawing pro-
posed controls on other industrial sources. The fundamental question is
whether EPA's predictions are reasonably accurate, perhaps within one or
two orders of magnitude, but scientists cannot answer this question dis-
positively given the imperfect state of current knowledge. Regulators must
consequently decide how they should allocate the legal and social burdens
associated with continuing scientific uncertainty.
In published explanations of its benzene decisions, EPA claimed its
analyses "represent plausible, if conservative, estimates of the magnitude
of the actual human cancer risk posed by benzene emitted from the source
categories evaluated." '175 The Agency was, however, forced to retreat from
this claim in several instances. The Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), for example, challenged CAG's derivation of the unit risk factor
through equal weighting of the three epidemiological studies. NRDC
argued that primary weight should have been given to the study yielding
the highest risk estimate.7 As noted above, CAG not only used the geo-
metric mean rather than the highest risk prediction among the three stud-
ies, but also took the geometric mean of historical exposure estimates in
computing the unit risk factor for each study. 77 Neither averaging treat-
ment explicitly provides "an ample margin of safety" under conditions of
uncertainty, as the statute mandates. 78 EPA also acknowledged that some
of its benzene exposure predictions "may overestimate or underestimate
actual emissions from individual sources," and these estimates "do not re-
flect a systematic conservatism." '79 In one document EPA candidly stated
its position that "[t]he choice of the most conservative assumption in each
case would result in estimates unreasonably biased in the direction of
overestimation."' 80 The Agency then maintained that its "risk assessment
175. EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,493 (1984) (emphasis added). See also
EPA Withdrawal of Proposed Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,558, 23,560 (1984); EPA Benzene Emis-
sions from Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, and Benzene Storage Vessels;
Proposed Withdrawal of Proposed Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 8386, 8388 (1984).
176. EPA Withdrawal of Proposed Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,558, 23,560 (1984).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100, 121-24.
178. See 42 U.S.C. §7112(b)(1)(8) (1982).
179. EPA Withdrawal of Proposed Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,558, 23,562 (1984).
180. Id. at 23,560.
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provides plausible, if not conservative, estimates of the benzene health
risks." '181
The analysis in this Part does not demonstrate that EPA must always
adopt the most protective possible treatment, nor that any particular
assessment practice in its benzene proceedings was necessarily improper.
Rather, under any test of administrative rationality, EPA's responses to
scientific uncertainty were neither consistent nor cogently explained. The
Agency selected conservative positions on some important issues, such as
its adoption of a nonthreshold extrapolation theory.182 In other instances
EPA relied on geometric means or mid-range positions, such as its treat-
ment of the sparse data on past exposure levels. On some issues, such as
pollutant dispersion modeling, the Agency employed methodologically
convenient but relatively unrealistic treatments. And in some contexts,
EPA adopted risk-assessment practices that are likely to result in underes-
timation of important variables. For example, CAG extrapolated from
occupational studies of "generally healthy, white males" to the "general
population for whom susceptibility to a carcinogenic insult could dif-
fer.' ' 183 Yet, EPA "is uncertain whether the unit risk factor can be accu-
rately applied to the general population, which includes men, women,
children, nonwhites, the aged, and the unhealthy."" 4 There was no unify-
ing logic in the Agency's treatments of different scientific uncertainties,
and EPA has never provided a coherent public explanation of its disparate
practices. Indeed, the regulatory record provides little indication that
Agency risk assessors recognized the diversity or social implications of
their responses to uncertainty. It is even less likely that EPA risk manag-
ers were aware of the inconsistent treatments of uncertainty, which were
obscured by the presentation of precise quantitative risk estimates.
I have not described the technical issues in EPA's benzene proceedings
only to demonstrate that scientific uncertainty pervades the risk-
assessment process, although that observation is essential for any analysis
of toxic substances regulation. My discussions with people in this field
suggest that few environmental or administrative law experts recognize
(1) the extent to which agencies adopt inconsistent treatments of diverse
uncertainties, (2) the tendency of risk assessors to trivialize uncertainty by
listing potentially offsetting factors without evaluation of their relative sig-
nificance, (3) the degree to which implicit social policy positions shape
181. Id. (emphasis added).
182. See EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,484-88 (1984).
183. Id. at 23,493.
184. Benzene Draft EIS, supra note 134, at E-16. The Agency also observed that the exposed
population is a "large, diverse, and genetically heterogeneous group" and that "genetic variability to
carcinogenesis is well documented." EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,485 (1984).
Yale Journal on Regulation
risk assessments that are ostensibly scientific in nature, and (4) the failure
of agencies to explain fully the bases for their selection of controversial
risk-assessment positions. These types of findings can be made only
through careful examination of actual regulatory proceedings, and yet an
understanding of such "details" is crucial for development of effective
risk-assessment strategies.
III. Ramifications of EPA's Emphasis on "Good Science"
The risk-assessment practices described above indicate that EPA's
attempt in its carcinogen guidelines and benzene proceedings to base risk
estimates on "the most scientifically appropriate interpretation"' 85 entails
several controversial social ramifications:
A. Trade-offs Between the Pursuit of "Good Science" and Effective
Protection Under Uncertainty
Although current guidelines embody some conservative risk-assessment
principles, the individualized "weight of evidence" approach coupled with
agency attempts to tailor all analyses in light of changing scientific knowl-
edge will often reduce the degree of protection previously
afforded by the IRLG guidelines. Few if any of the revised treatments in
the guidelines have achieved general scientific acceptance, and EPA does
not contend that most uncertainties can be resolved with reasonable scien-
tific assurance. Given the imperfect state of the risk-assessment art, regu-
lators must decide how much potential but uncertain public protection
should be traded for some potential but uncertain improvement in the
accuracy of scientific judgments that EPA clearly recognizes are far from
reliable. The present guidelines assume that every tentative step, however
provisional, in the direction of "good science" is warranted regardless of
its possible effect on the scope of protection. The wisdom of this presump-
tion is surely a public policy issue rather than a purely scientific question.
The new guidelines reflect a relative shift in EPA's emphasis on two
recurring questions in toxic substances regulation: Is there sufficient relia-
ble evidence that a chemical produces "toxic" effects at high or unknown
past exposure levels, and is there enough evidence to derive reliable quan-
titative risk-assessments at specific exposure levels.' 86 If the Agency delays
regulation until the "weight of evidence" enables predictions about specific
dose-response relationships, as the guidelines presume, then EPA may
185. EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992 (1986).
186. For a discussion of this important distinction in the two kinds of evidence on toxicity, see
Latin, supra note 5, at 344-45.
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allow years of continued exposures to a known toxic substance because the
precise level of toxicity cannot be reliably estimated. The Agency decision
to wait until regulators can meet the particularized evidentiary require-
ments of the guidelines is equally a decision to stress scientific validity
rather than safety after an indeterminate toxic hazard has been qualita-
tively identified. This preference is neither inevitable nor consistent with
past practices.
As one illustration of how a requirement for "good science" in regula-
tory determinations can affect the scope of public protection, the Clean
Water Act initially provided that EPA must control toxic pollutants based
on their degree of toxicity. 18 7 This harm-based regulatory strategy presup-
posed that EPA could produce particularized assessments of the hazards
created by specific substances. After the Agency's failure to issue any toxic
water pollutant standards was challenged in litigation, EPA adopted a
"technology-based" approach in which it imposed strict standards based
on qualitative proof that a substance is "toxic" and that controls are tech-
nologically and economically feasible.' 88 The EPA Assistant Administra-
tor for Water and Hazardous Materials testified before Congress that the
original approach was "technically impractical" because the Agency could
not "demonstrate the cause and effect relationship between pollutants and
public health."' 89 Administrator Costle similarly testified in 1977 that
"experience with the alternative approaches ...leave[s] us firmly con-
vinced that for the bulk of known or suspected toxics of concern,
technology-based standards established on an industry-by-industry basis
are by far the most feasible to implement and administer."19 In short,
EPA adopted the technology-based regulatory approach because the
Agency lacked the information necessary to perform quantitative risk
assessments and because it decided that protective regulatory action was
necessary despite scientific uncertainty. 9' The carcinogen guidelines, in
contrast, require precisely the kind of individualized evidence that EPA
had previously found difficult to obtain, and in recent years the Agency
has promulgated few harm-based standards for toxic water pollutants.
The current EPA guidelines claim that the "impetus for this revision is
187. See 33 U.S.C. §1317(a) (1982).
188. See W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL. LAW 486-87 (1977); Latin, supra note 11, at 1307-09.
189. EPA Focuses on 1983 BAT Requirements to Control Most Toxic Pollutants, 8 ENV'T REP.
(BNA) 476 (1977) (reporting the testimony of Thomas Jorling).
190. HOUSE COMM. ON PUB. WORKS AND TRANSP., 95TH CONG., IST SESS., IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE FEDERAL WATER PoUI.uTION CONTROL ACT: SUMMARY OF HEARINGS ON THE REGULA-
TION AND MONITORING OF Toxic AND HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS UNDER THE FEDERAL WATER
POLLUTION CONTROl. ACT (Pub.L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972)) 26 (Comm. Print 1977).
191. See Latin, supra note 11, at 1308-09. 1 believe EPA has promulgated more toxic substances
standards in the past decade under this one technology-based program than it has under all of its
programs that require quantitative risk assessments based on "good science."
Yale Journal on Regulation
the need to incorporate . . . the concepts and approaches to carcinogen
risk assessment that have been developed during the last ten years.'
'1 92
Yet, the guidelines never specify which scientific advances now enable
reliable risk assessments, and they acknowledge the existence of the same
uncertainties that previously impeded regulation. Of special concern, the
guidelines do not indicate what regulatory actions are appropriate during
the often lengthy period between the time a substance has been identified
qualitatively as "toxic" and the time quantitative risk estimates become
practicable. To the extent administrators are now required to support reg-
ulation of carcinogens with the kind of "weight of evidence" assessments
envisioned in the guidelines, this position clearly places the burden of sci-
entific uncertainty on exposed populations.
B. Effects on Agency Behavior
The pursuit of "good science" based on individualized circumstances is
likely to increase the decisionmaking costs and time requirements associ-
ated with the risk-assessment process. With respect to animal tests, for
example, the guidelines state that the "weight of evidence" for potential
human hazards rises "with the increase in number of animal species,
strains, sexes, and number of experiments and doses showing a carcino-
genic response."' 93 With respect to data from epidemiological studies, the
guidelines similarly observe that the "weight of evidence increases rapidly
with the number of adequate studies that show comparable results on
populations exposed to the same agent under different conditions." 19
Both types of studies are expensive, may take years to complete, and are
frequently inconclusive. The carcinogen guidelines, however, never
address EPA budgetary restrictions or the time-lag, with accompanying
irreversible health effects, that may occur while regulators wait for suffi-
cient data to make reliable scientific judgments.
A more subtle ramification is that the guidelines invite Agency officials
to evaluate their own performance, and that of their subordinates, in
terms of scientific competency rather than regulatory competency. If the
primary decisional criteria is whether regulators select the "most scientifi-
cally appropriate interpretation to assess risk," officials may be reluctant
to choose speculative treatments that increase public safety under condi-
tions of uncertainty but cannot be identified as the most plausible scientific
192. EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,993 (1986).
193. Id. at 33,994. "In general, although a single study may be indicative of a cause-effect rela-
tionship, confidence in inferring a causal association is increased when several independent studies are
concordant in showing the association . Id. at 33,999.
194. Id. at 33,995.
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theories among a constellation of competing hypotheses. Moreover, the
majority of interveners in regulatory proceedings are sponsored by affected
industries or trade associations, 95 which means the scientific performance
of agency officials will regularly be monitored and challenged by industry
scientists who advocate less conservative risk assessment practices. Agency
bureaucrats, like other people, are sensitive to criticism and may deliber-
ately or subconsciously seek to placate persistent critics.' 96
C. Increased Opportunities for Obstructive Behavior by Affected Parties
Even if Agency risk assessors are assumed to be motivated solely by a
desire to conduct the best possible scientific analyses based on the available
evidence, a comparable assumption cannot be applied to the goals of inter-
veners who espouse conflicting private interests. 9 The primary incentive
of industry representatives is to minimize regulatory costs, not to promote
good science. The primary interest of environmentalist interveners is to
minimize health and ecological risks irrespective of regulatory costs, not to
promote good science. The "weight of evidence" approach embodied in
the carcinogen guidelines allows parties in each proceeding to make any
conceivable scientific argument-and some inconceivable ones if past prac-
tices are any guide-that may affect agency decisionmaking directly
through the force of debatable scientific arguments or indirectly through
increased delays and costs.
D. Increased Opportunities for Abuse of Discretion by Agency
Decisionmakers
Emphasis on individualized "weight of evidence" judgments may enable
regulators to make ideologically motivated decisions under the guise that
they represent "good science." In 1982, for example, the EPA Assistant
Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances, John Todhunter, con-
cluded that formaldehyde poses only a low carcinogenic risk which need
not be regulated under the Toxic Substances Control Act.' 98 This decision
ostensibly was predicated on the Agency's risk assessment, not on regula-
tory cost considerations or political values incorporated in the risk-
management process. Todhunter's formaldehyde risk assessment, however,
incorporated many questionable analytical assumptions. He presumed
that a safe threshold level exists for low exposures, that only body-site
specific tumors should be counted in the test results, that positive animal
195. See, e.g., id. at 34,001; EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,480 (1984).
196. See Bayley, Memoirs of a Fox, 2 ENV'T AFF. 332 (1972-73).
197. See Latin, supra note 11, at 1292-97.
198. See Ashford, Ryan & Caldart, supra note 32, at 324-43, 346-54.
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tests do not fairly indicate human hazards, and that vulnerable people will
protect themselves because high exposures may cause unpleasant irritant
effects.' 99 EPA adopted these assumptions on an ad hoc basis despite their
inconsistency with previous Agency practices and with risk-assessment
principles widely held in the scientific community. Indeed, the contempo-
raneous scientific literature sharply criticized Todhunter's analytical posi-
tions and conclusions.200 After Todhunter left office, the Agency reopened
the formaldehyde issue and decided in 1984 that two categories of emis-
sions sources should be regulated.2'
Although the analytical principles in the EPA's carcinogen guidelines
and 1984 benzene assessment frequently conflict with the practices
selected by Todhunter, nothing in the guidelines would prevent an Agency
official from intentionally using debatable outcome-oriented assumptions
whenever he or she asserts that those risk-assessment treatments are war-
ranted by the weight of scientific evidence. For example, the guidelines
provide: "Evidence indicating that high exposures alter tumor responses
by indirect mechanisms that may be unrelated to effects at lower expo-
sures should be dealt with on an individual basis." 20 2 This provision
apparently would allow Agency decisionmakers to find that a safe thresh-
old exposure level exists for a particular carcinogenic substance. The pub-
lic policy problem with this degree of quasi-scientific discretion is that
regulatory judgments expressed as individualized findings of "good sci-
ence" are likely to be less visible and more immune from effective judicial
or legislative review than decisions clearly based on economic concerns or
controversial political values.
E. Susceptibility to Intrusive Judicial Review
Agency contentions that toxic controls are grounded on "good science"
may increase the vulnerability of regulations to hostile judicial review.
The CPSC, for example, tried to regulate urea-formaldehyde foam insula-
tion on the basis of one experiment in which more than 40% of the ani-
mals contracted cancer within 24 months.03 This finding showed an
unusually high degree of carcinogenic potency in comparison with the
199. See id. at 330-32; Latin, supra note 11, at 1327-28.
200. See Ashford, Ryan & Caldart, Law and Science Policy in Federal Regulation of Formalde-
hyde, 222 SCIENCE 894 (1983); Hileman, Formaldehyde; How Did EPA Develop Its Formaldehyde
Policy?, 16 ENVrL. ScI. & TECH. 543 (1982); Marshall, EPA's High-Risk Carcinogen Policy, 218
SCIENCE 975 (1982); Perera & Petito, Formaldehyde: A Question of Cancer Policy?, 216 SCIENCE
1287 (1982).
201. See EPA Formaldehyde; Determination of Significant Risk, 49 Fed. Reg. 21,870 (1984).
202. EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,995 (1986).
203. See Gulf S. Insulation v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 701 F.2d 1137, 1141, 1146 (5th
Cir. 1983); Ashford, Ryan & Caldart, supra note 32, at 317-20.
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animal data on other toxics in widespread use.2"" In Gulf South Insula-
tion v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit overturned the formaldehyde regulation because the judi-
cial panel decided "it is not good science to rely on a single experiment,
particularly one involving only 240 subjects, to make precise estimates of
cancer risk .. . . To make precise estimates, precise data are
required. 20 5 The opinion provided no intimation of how much precision
is required for risk estimates nor how much "precise data" are necessary
to constitute substantial evidence in support of regulatory judgments. The
Fifth Circuit judges, however, apparently were prepared to make this
decision themselves rather than to defer to Agency determinations.
The court's opinion reflects insensitivity to the protective goals of the
organic regulatory legislation2"" and a fundamental misunderstanding of
the limited evidence on which most risk assessments of carcinogens are
based. Urea-formaldehyde foam insulation was a relatively new product,
which precludes the acquisition of human epidemiologic data given long
latency periods for many forms of cancer. With respect to the animal data,
240 subjects is a relatively large cohort in comparison with most experi-
ments.20 7 Moreover, virtually all regulatory discussions of toxic hazards
agree that test results from the most sensitive species and exposure condi-
tions should receive special weight in risk assessments of carcinogens.1
08
Thus, findings of lower potency in subsequent studies would not necessa-
rily negate the significance of the initial finding of high toxic potency.
Many, if not most, quantitative risk assessments based on animal test data
have relied on findings from one experiment or one series of related tests
conducted by a single group of experimenters. The Court of Appeals
opinion seems to assume that valid science requires agencies to average the
results of several positive tests before developing a quantitative risk assess-
ment or finding that a substance causes cancer in humans. This judicial
conclusion is not generally accepted in the scientific community nor war-
ranted from the viewpoint of good regulation.209
204, For discussions of the animal test data on benzene, see DHS BENZENE REPORT, supra note
39, at 84-93; supra text accompanying notes 145-66. CPSC had also attempted to regulate benzene
on the basis of very limited data. See Luken & Miller, supra note 40, at 1255.
205. Gulf S. Insulation, 701 F.2d at 1146 (emphasis added).
206. The court did not consider the social consequences of allowing the toxic hazard to continue
while the Agency tries to accumulate precise data on formaldehyde cancer risks, nor whether this
allocation of the burden of uncertainty is compatible with the principles and priorities in the organic
act. See Latin, supra note 11, at 1327-29 & n.305.
207. For a discussion of the animal cohorts used in studies of benzene toxicity, see DHS BENZENE
REPORT, supra note 39, at 84-99.
208. See, e.g., EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,997 (1986); DHS BENZENE
REPORT, supra note 39, at 65.
209. EPA's current carcinogen guidelines observe that a single study could demonstrate a suffi-
cient cause-effect relationship, although the Agency would prefer results from additional sources. See
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In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Institute,21 ° the Supreme Court invalidated OSHA's 1978 benzene regu-
lation on the ground that the Agency had failed to prove its standard was
"reasonably necessary" to prevent a "significant" risk of harm at prevail-
ing exposure levels.21 ' Compliance with this judicially-imposed "signifi-
cance" test presupposes quantitative risk assessments at specific exposure
levels, despite OSHA's contention that it could not produce reliable dose-
response estimates for carcinogens. 12 Notwithstanding its many analytical
deficiencies, 13 the Court's benzene decision has been followed by courts in
a variety of toxic regulation contexts214 and has induced federal agencies
to conclude that they must provide quantitative risk estimates even if they
lack confidence in the resulting judgments.215 In response to the Court's
opinion, OSHA indicated that it would determine whether potential car-
cinogens pose "significant" risks at specific exposure levels after individu-
alized analyses of the scientific evidence. 16 Under the Reagan Adminis-
tration, however, OSHA has not reduced the permissible discharge limit
for any industrial benzene source below the level initially set in 1969.217
Contemporaneous with its 1978 benzene proceedings, OSHA was
developing a generic cancer policy intended to preclude individualized
analyses of speculative scientific theories and supporting data that the
Agency had previously considered and rejected. 18 The plurality opinion
EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,999 (1986); cf supra note 62 (data from most
sensitive species should be used "in absence of evidence to the contrary").
210. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
211. Id. at 639-40, 652-59.
212. See Latin, supra note 5, at 344-45. The Court confused the use of quantitative evidence to
show excess deaths from all levels of past benzene exposure with the use of that evidence to establish
the risks created by particular emission levels. When past exposure levels are unknown or are much
higher than current levels, epidemiologic data may document carcinogenic hazards from past exposure
without providing any insight on the risks arising from current discharge levels. I described this as a
distinction between "aggregate" and "disaggregated" risks. See id. at 346, 385-86.
213. There is no need to repeat here my previous criticisms of the plurality opinion's inept treat-
ment of the scientific evidence and its confused interpretation of the toxic substances provision in the
OSH Act. See Latin, supra note 5; see also Sullivan, The Benzene Decision: A Contribution to Regu-
latory Confusion, 33 ADMIN. L. REv. 351 (1981).
214. See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 505 n.25 (1981); Asbestos
Information Ass'n v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 424-26 (5th Cir. 1984); Gulf S. Insulation v. Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n, 701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1983); United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d
1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); Texas Indep. Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall,
630 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1980).
215. See EPA Withdrawal of Proposed Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,558, 23,559 (1984); Cross,
supra note 25, at 12-43; Preuss & White, supra note 43, at 333 (Supreme Court's benzene decision
had "probably the greatest impact" in increasing agency reliance on quantitative risk assessment).
216. See OSHA Indentification, Classification and Regulation of Potential Occupational Carcino-
gens; Proposed Amendments, 46 Fed. Reg. 7402 (1981).
217. Because the existing 10 ppm benzene standard was established to prevent nonmalignant
blood diseases, see supra note 85, the upshot is that OSHA has never imposed regulatory restrictions
based on the carcinogenic effects of widespread benzene exposures.
218. See OSHA Identification, Classification and Regulation of Toxic Substances Posing a Poten-
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in Industrial Union presumed that OSHA had impermissibly relied on
this generic policy in its benzene proceeding. 19 The Court then intimated
that the Agency must always consider potentially relevant scientific evi-
dence on an individualized basis.22 This judicial treatment was partly
grounded on the erroneous assumption that OSHA had been able in other
toxics proceedings to obtain sufficient evidence on cancer risks at specific
exposure levels to meet the "significance" test.22 The Court never consid-
ered the impacts of its requirement for individualized risk assessments on
agency decisionmaking costs and regulatory delays. Unfortunately, the
treatment mandated by the plurality opinion invites affected parties to
submit the same kinds of speculative theories and data in every hearing on
toxic hazards. This is precisely what has occurred in subsequent proceed-
ings on benzene conducted by OSHA, EPA, and other agencies.222
Unrealistic judicial requirements for comprehensive agency assessments
of all potentially relevant factors and for a high degree of scientific preci-
sion have substantially emasculated environmental control programs in the
past decade.223 Yet, EPA's current "good science" orientation exacerbates
this problem. Regulated industries and other interveners invariably can
challenge the scientific bases of carcinogen risk assessments because uncer-
tainty is pervasive and agency officials must adopt many debatable proce-
dures in response to resource constraints and limited data. If regulators
tial Occupational Carcinogenic Risk, 42 Fed. Reg. 54,146 (1977). This generic policy was formally
adopted at 45 Fed. Reg. 5002 (1980), but has been almost entirely ignored by the Agency under the
current administration.
219. See Latin, supra note 5, at 364-67.
220. OSHA itself interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in this manner, and amended the
generic cancer policy to indicate that it would make individualized determinations of carcinogenic
risks. OSHA did not, however, explain how it would implement this policy in practice. See OSHA
Indentification, Classification and Regulation of Potential Occupational Carcinogens; Conforming De-
letions, 46 Fed. Reg. 4889 (1981).
221. Justice Stevens cited several regulatory proceedings where he thought OSHA had produced
sufficient individualized evidence on cancer risks, see Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 656-57 & n.64 (1980), but he clearly misunderstood and mischaracter-
ized the scientific evidence submitted on those other carcinogens. See Latin, supra note 5, at 369-80,
384-88.
222. In proceedings on benzene risk levels held after the Supreme Court's decision, industry rep-
resentatives made many of the same arguments and submitted the same questionable data that OSHA
had found unpersuasive in its 1978 benzene regulatory hearing and generic cancer policy. Compare
Latin, supra note 5, at 361-64, 367-71, 378-79 with EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg.
23,478, 23,483 (1984) and EPA Proposed Standards for Benzene Emissions, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,522,
23,527 (1984).
223. See Huber, supra note 74; Latin, supra note 5; Stewart, supra note 11, at 1274-75,
1338-40. Professor Jerry Mashaw draws similar conclusions in a study on the effects of judicial
review on automobile safety regulation. See Mashaw & Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The
Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REGc. 257, 312-313 (1987). 1 find persuasive Mashaw's
conclusion that intrusive judicial review has paralyzed rulemaking programs in complex technical
areas because appellate courts focus on the adequacy of agency decisionmaking, which inevitably
appears imperfect in retrospect, rather than on achievement of the protective goals of the regulatory
statutes.
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explicitly rely on quasi-legislative policy choices under conditions of scien-
tific uncertainty, rather than pretending that their risk-assessment deci-
sions are predicated on reliable scientific judgments, appellate courts
might be less prone to accept arguments that agency analyses are irra-
tional or flawed from a scientific perspective. There is no perfect way for
administrators to protect their decisions against unsympathetic appellate
review, but the current agency emphasis on "good science" invites judicial
criticism of toxic risk assessments on grounds where the assessments are
sure to be especially vulnerable.
IV. Integration of Science and Social Policy Judgments
EPA's carcinogen guidelines and an influential National Research
Council study maintain that risk assessors should strive to make the best
possible scientific judgments based on current knowledge and ordinarily
should divorce these judgments from the economic, political, and ethical
dimensions of regulation.224 No one favors bad science, but this "good
science" perspective is simplistic and potentially harmful in toxic contexts
where the best available science is unreliable. When no consensus exists
on how to resolve fundamental scientific uncertainties, policy considera-
tions should and must influence agency choices on which provisional risk
estimates to adopt. Explicit incorporation of social policy judgments into
the risk-assessment process raises two related problems: Which types of
policy criteria should be considered in risk-assessment analyses as well as
risk-management decisions, and should the distinction between risk assess-
ment and risk management be maintained once risk assessors employ so-
cial policy criteria to resolve scientific uncertainties.
A. Applicable Social Policy Criteria
Several types of policy criteria can guide risk assessments when an
agency decides that the best available science is insufficient to yield relia-
ble risk estimates. Some of these criteria may be evaluated once for each
regulatory program and can provide the basis for generic treatments of
recurring issues, while other material factors are linked to the particular
characteristics of each toxic substance and must receive individualized
treatments.
224. See EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,993 (1986); NATIONAL. RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 151-52.
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1. Interpretation of Legislative Policies
An agency choice among competing treatments of uncertainty on any
scientific issue should be shaped by the policies in the applicable regula-
tory legislation. Legislatures have often recognized scientific uncertainties
associated with toxic hazards and nonetheless required agencies to impose
effective regulatory controls.2 25 For example, the Occupational Safety and
Health Act's legislative history observed "it is vital that when the Secre-
tary sets an occupational health standard he do so on the basis of the best
available evidence; it is not intended that the Secretary be paralyzed by
debate surrounding diverse medical opinions."22 In a similar manner, the
DHS benzene assessment was conducted pursuant to a statutory mandate
that provides "while absolute and undisputed scientific evidence may not
be available to determine the exact nature and extent of risk from toxic air
contaminants, it is necessary to take action to protect public health." '2 27
These legislative prescriptions do not offer a complete program for defin-
ing how agencies should resolve scientific uncertainties, but they do pro-
vide guidance that may help regulators develop their own systematic social
policy responses. Explicit legislative mandates for protection against toxic
substances despite the recognized presence of uncertainty should caution
against agency adoption of "good science" requirements that in effect pre-
clude control of most known or probable toxic hazards.
The Clean Air Act's treatment of hazardous air pollutants may provide
another illustration of how regulators can shape risk-assessment practices
in light of specific legislative policies. The Act requires national ambient
air quality standards (NAAQS) to maintain an "adequate margin of
safety," while standards for hazardous air pollutants must provide an
"ample margin of safety to protect the public health."2 2 The unequivocal
language on hazardous air pollutants indicates that Congress intended to
place a high, and possibly absolute, priority on assurance of public protec-
tion in this regulatory context.229 The legislative history of the 1977
Amendments expressed congressional dissatisfaction with the failure of
NAAQS to include safety margins equal to those in other environmental
control programs, such as radiation standards.23 0 The Committee com-
225. See, e.g., Latin, supra note 5, at 381-83; Latin, supra note 12, at 603-05, 612, 620-21.
226. SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCU-
PATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALrH ACT of 1970, at 848 (1971) [hereinafter OSH ACT LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY].
227. DHS BENZENE OVERVIEW, supra note 166, at 2 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§39650(e) (West 1986)).
228. See 42 U.S.C. §7409(b)(1) (1982).
229. See D. CURRIE, supra note 75, at §§ 3.26, 3.28.
230. See CONGRESSIONAL. RESEARCH SERV., 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., 4 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE CLEAN AIR Acr AMENDMENTS OF 1977, at 2573-95, 2674-78 (Comm. Print 95-16, 1978).
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ments justified "adequate" safety margins of one to two orders of magni-
tude in response to scientific uncertainty about the health effects of wide-
spread air pollutants.2"' It seems reasonable to conclude that hazardous
air pollutant standards, which are at least equally subject to scientific
uncertainty and are supposed to include "ample" safety margins, should
be even more biased in the direction of protection than the NAAQS limits.
This interpretation is consistent with Congress's special concern for pro-
tection against toxic hazards, as expressed in an array of regulatory stat-
utes enacted during the past two decades.2"2 Yet, EPA has not attempted
to resolve the many uncertainties presented by regulation of toxic air or
water pollutants systematically in light of this congressional preference.
Juxtaposition of the statutory meanings of "adequate" and "ample"
safety margins suggests that conservative treatments of toxic risks would
generally be more compatible with congressional intent than "mid-range"
positions, and the same conclusion would apply to "best-current-guess"
estimates unless they can be made with a high degree of scientific confi-
dence. This interpretation does not mandate the most protective possible
risk-assessment treatment on every contested issue, nor does it imply that
the statutory language and legislative history are so clear that they pre-
clude any degree of administrative discretion. The statutory preference for
"ample" safety margins is, however, sufficiently palpable to require that
EPA provide a persuasive rationale, not merely conclusory assertions, in
hazardous pollutant contexts where the Agency selects less conservative
positions. Although EPA's carcinogen guidelines adopt protective treat-
ments on some important issues, they do not incorporate a consistently
conservative bias2"' nor provide any explanation of how "ample" safety
margins will be assured for carcinogenic air pollutants. Indeed, the guide-
lines ignore this statutory provision and instead require individualized
analyses based on the best available, albeit not necessarily "good," scien-
tific evidence and theories.
EPA's only reference in its benzene proceedings to an "ample margin of
safety" appears to distort the statutory meaning of the clause. After deriv-
ing unit-risk and exposure estimates, the Agency identified the degree of
pollution reduction available through application of the "best available"
control technology (BAT) for coke by-product recovery plants. 3 4 EPA
compared the protection achievable by its designated BAT with the incre-
231. See id.; D. CURRIE, supra note 75, at § 7.11.
232. See Latin, supra note 5, at 392-93 & n.449.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 44-68.
234. See EPA Proposed Standards for Benzene Emissions, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,522, 23,533-35
(1984).
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mental safety offered by more stringent measures2 35 and predicted that
better-than-BAT control technologies would reduce the risk only from
0.19 to 0.06 leukemia cases per year at considerably higher cost. 3 The
Agency then concluded:
Because of the relatively small health benefits to be gained with
the additional costs and the potential adverse economic impacts on
some firms of requiring the [better than BAT] option, EPA considers
the risks remaining after application of BAT not to be unreasonable.
For this reason, EPA judged the level of control selected as BAT to
provide an ample margin of safety and decided not to require a more
stringent level of control than BAT for coke by-product recovery
plants.
237
EPA's risk assessments for BAT and for more protective control tech-
nologies used identical treatments of the unit-risk factor, pollutant disper-
sion patterns, and exposed populations; the only difference was in pro-
jected discharge levels. The Agency did not include an ample margin or
any systematic safety margin in its scientific assessment of benzene risks
and cited the statutory clause only in its risk-management analysis of reg-
ulatory cost-effectiveness. Even if EPA may consider costs in setting haz-
ardous air pollutant standards, 3 ' the risk-management analysis should be
235. The Agency explained its analytical process as follows:
Best available technology for new and existing sources is technology which, in the judgment
of the Administrator, is the most advanced level of control considering the economic, energy,
and environmental impacts and any technological problems associated with retrofitting of
existing sources.
After selecting BAT, EPA identified a level of control more stringent than BAT and evalu-
ated the incremental reductions in health risks obtainable against the incremental costs and
economic impacts estimated to result from the application of the more stringent control level.
This provides a comparison of the costs and economic impacts of control with the benefits of
further risk reduction.
Id. at 23,533. This treatment is confusing and appears incompatible with the legislative intent. If a
more stringent control technology is technologically and economically feasible, see id. at 23,535-37,
how did EPA designate less stringent technology as the most advanced and best available BAT level?
It appears to me that the Agency first used cost-effectiveness criteria to identify a control level some-
what arbitrarily as BAT, and then used a further cost-effectiveness comparison to justify its decision
not to impose better control measures. I believe Congress imposed either an absolute priority on safety
from toxic substances or a feasibility test, not a cost-effectiveness balancing process, for most toxic
control programs. See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508-12 (1981);
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 42-48; Latin, supra note 5, at 320.
236. The Agency estimated that requiring the more stringent set of controls would entail capital
costs of $131 million and marginal operating costs of $37.5 million per year. See EPA Proposed
Standards for Benzene Emissions, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,522, 23,537 (1984).
237. Id. (emphasis added).
238. Although EPA may not consider regulatory costs in setting ambient pollution limits under
the NAAQS, the Agency construed the hazardous air pollutants provision to allow balancing of con-
trol costs and regulatory benefits. See Goldstein, supra note 103, at 298. This administrative interpre-
tation implausibly presumes that Congress was more concerned about the economic impacts of regula-
tory standards for especially dangerous toxic discharges than it was with regard to the costs of less
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performed after risk estimates are adjusted to reflect ample safety margins
under conditions of scientific uncertainty. Although agencies must be given
latitude to interpret their statutory mandates, I do not see how EPA could
plausibly contend that its selective treatment of safety margins in the ben-
zene proceedings was consistent with the applicable congressional balance
of interests and priorities in the organic statute.
2. Cost-Effectiveness of Individualized Analyses
If the effectiveness of toxic substances control programs is considered on
a synoptic level, regulatory agencies must acknowledge that their achieve-
ments have fallen far short of legislative intentions. Indeed, these pro-
grams often suffer from bureaucratic paralysis and are invariably more
expensive and time-consuming than Congress or the agencies themselves
expected. Notwithstanding its criticisms of the administrative process, the
National Research Council rightly concluded that "the basic problem in
risk assessment is the sparseness and uncertainty of the scientific knowl-
edge of the health hazards addressed, and this problem has no ready solu-
tion."' 23 9 Yet, agencies have seldom examined the effectiveness of their
risk-assessment procedures in light of this fundamental problem. Given
the inherent complexity of toxic hazards and severe constraints on agency
resources, regulators must consider which analytical procedures are cost-
effective and which scientific issues are worth assessing repeatedly in indi-
vidualized proceedings.
EPA's carcinogen guidelines are almost entirely lacking in this form of
self-analysis. The guidelines provide no indication of which risk-
assessment issues are especially difficult or expensive to address. They do
not specify which analytical issues cannot now be resolved in a reasonably
reliable manner due to the absence of any scientific consensus and which
issues have been raised repetitively but inconclusively in prior regulatory
proceedings. They do not identify which risk-assessment issues and proce-
dures are likely to enable obstructive behavior by regulated parties. For
example, EPA and DHS were required in their 1984 proceedings on ben-
zene risks to assess debatable extrapolation theories and negative epidemi-
ological data that had been examined in detail and rejected by OSHA,
CAG, and IARC in earlier analyses. Given the great difficulty in regulat-
ing any toxic substance, it is doubtful that agencies should assess in each
instance whether safe threshold levels exist, whether one speculative
hazardous NAAQS pollutants. Even if EPA is correct that economic effects should be considered, that
objective can be achieved under the feasibility test commonly used for toxic controls and need not
justify the Agency's adoption of a cost-effectiveness test based on speculative risk estimates.
239. NATIONAL. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 6.
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extrapolation theory should be preferred over competing models, and
whether benign tumors should be excluded from findings of animal stud-
ies. No doubt these and many other recurring issues are relevant to attain-
ment of the best possible science, but individualized assessments of all
material scientific issues in all toxic control proceedings may preclude
achievement of adequate and timely protection for exposed populations.
OSHA's generic cancer policy under the Carter Administration
attempted to foreclose discussion of many contested issues that the Agency
had previously addressed. 4" EPA's current carcinogen guidelines go to the
opposite extreme by mandating individualized analyses of any potentially
relevant scientific theories or data in each proceeding. Regulators might
choose an intermediate position in which generic presumptions against
certain kinds of theories or evidence could be rebutted by a credible show-
ing that a scientific consensus has emerged on a previously contested issue.
Risk assessors should recognize that their treatments of recurring issues
and uncertainties have important implications for the scope, cost, and tim-
ing of toxic substances regulation. It is unclear whether EPA's disregard
of such factors in the carcinogen guidelines represents an instance of sci-
entific tunnel vision or a deliberate attempt to impede effective regulation,
but the guidelines and accompanying explanatory statements never ques-
tion the utility of the Agency's "good science" focus.
3. Potential for Catastrophic Miscalculations
Regulators could increase the conservative bias in their risk estimates
when a particular toxic substance may have catastrophic effects if it
proves more potent than the agency assessment anticipates. The presence
of several individualized circumstances might support this form of social
policy judgment:
a. Widespread Population Exposures
Some chemical usage and dispersion patterns entail significant expo-
sures for only a relatively small number of workers or residents near pol-
lution sources, while other hazardous substances may endanger millions of
people. If the "best-current-guess" prediction underestimates actual risks
by more than two orders of magnitude for pollutants where exposure is
limited or localized, the result may be "only" a few dozen unexpected
fatalities. In contrast, similar mistakes in estimation of the risks from
widespread toxic exposures may have catastrophic effects, such as those
240. See OSHA Generic Cancer Policy, 45 Fed. Reg. 5002 (1980); Latin, supra note 5, at
364-66.
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associated with asbestos and DES. For example, because benzene is a
ubiquitous chemical, Dr. Albert noted that a risk-assessment error of sev-
eral orders of magnitude "would be a national disaster."241 Most regula-
tory assessments now treat a predicted high risk for a small group as sta-
tistically equivalent to a predicted small risk for a large population, but
that approach does not adequately consider the possible consequences of
mistakes in the agency's determinations.
It is widely recognized that susceptibilities of individuals and popula-
tion subgroups to toxic hazards vary widely, but there is currently no
accepted methodology for tailoring risk estimates in response to those dif-
ferences.242 Present risk estimates are usually based on dose-response data
derived from epidemiological studies of the entire population or of white
male workers. Agency decisionmakers may, however, choose to adjust risk
estimates in order to provide additional protection for unusually vulnera-
ble subgroups, as in the cases of exposure of children to high lead concen-
trations or of pregnant working women to certain hazardous industrial
chemicals. Again, this precautionary judgment would reflect social policy
considerations in light of the possible consequences of agency mistakes
under conditions of scientific uncertainty, rather than the current practice
of treating risk assessment purely as a function of "good science."
b. Absence of a Long Historical Record of Exposures
Some toxic substances, such as benzene, have been in common use for
decades at higher exposure levels than are now prevalent. This historical
record reduces the chance of catastrophic risk-assessment errors because
hazards of epidemic proportions presumably would already have mani-
fested themselves. In contrast, many substances are introduced each year
that may eventually have toxic effects, and long latency periods may con-
ceal those hazards for decades. Regulators might increase the conservative
bias in their risk estimates for substances that lack a long historical record
of exposures and related health effects. Yet, agencies seldom consider this
factor in their scientific risk-assessment deliberations. The legislative his-
tory of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, for example, emphasized
the uncertainty created by "literally hundreds of new chemicals" that are
"introduced into industry at a much faster rate than the present meager
[regulatory] resources . . . can keep up with."24 OSHA's generic cancer
241. Comments, supra note 46, at 329.
242. See EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,997 (1986); EPA Regulation of
Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,479, 23,485 (1984); DHS BENZENE REPORT, supra note 39, at
52-53; Comments in 19 BANBURY REPORT, RISK QUANTITATION AND REGULATORY POtucY, 337,
340 (D. Hoel, R. Merrill & F. Perera eds. 1985) (comment of Dr. Perera).
243. OSH Ar LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 226, at 142, 849; see also id. at 159-60, 415,
517, 1048-49.
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policy and individual risk assessments, however, have not made distinc-
tions in the treatments of longstanding and new chemicals.2"
c. Evidence of Unusual Potency
Regulators may occasionally receive evidence that a substance is unusu-
ally hazardous prior to their acquisition of sufficient data for a reliable
dose-response assessment. In some instances, the substance under investi-
gation may have a close chemical resemblance to another substance whose
hazardous effects have been clearly documented, or it might yield positive
results in short-term in vitro tests. In other cases, data from animal stud-
ies may reveal an especially high degree of toxic potency. Risk assessors
could decide on the basis of these preliminary but suggestive indications of
severe toxic hazards to increase the conservative bias in risk estimates
derived from incomplete data. For example, CPSC tried to regulate for-
maldehyde after one animal study found that the substance may be an
unusually potent carcinogen, while the Fifth Circuit's contrary decision
left millions of people exposed to a hazard of unknown but potentially
serious dimensions.245
4. Ability to Resolve Uncertainty
In practice, agencies seldom commence regulatory proceedings until
considerable evidence has accumulated that a substance may be hazardous.
When sufficient information or public controversy exists to justify an
expensive risk-assessment hearing, agency experts usually consider
whatever data happen to be available at the time. As Dr. Albert noted
"[r]isk assessment is a passive operation which accepts the data that comes
in.' ' 2 " In some instances, however, agencies may be able to identify on-
going scientific studies or to sponsor collection of data on acute toxic ef-
fects, prevailing exposure patterns, or other material issues. In such cases,
regulators might adopt interim strategies on the assumption that specific
uncertainties can be resolved in the near future. They might, for example,
allow a substance under investigation, such as a newly developed drug, to
be used when no substitute is available but not if its primary advantage is
lower costs. Because risk assessors typically cannot predict the outcome of
244. Some regulatory programs, such as those for drugs and pesticides, require industry to test
substances for possible toxic effects before they can be marketed. Although these regulatory require-
ments nominally place the burden of proof on the new chemical, there is little indication that EPA
and other responsible agencies vary their scientific risk assessment practices in a systematic manner
based on the distinction between familiar and new substances.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 203-09.
246. Comments, supra note 46, at 325.
Yale Journal on Regulation
scientific research with assurance, this type of hedging strategy clearly en-
tails a problematical policy choice to accept some risks on a tentative basis
in return for the social benefits associated with use of the toxic sub-
stance.247 This criterion could, however, facilitate abuse of discretion by
agency officials because it may allow amorphous trade-offs influenced by
political or economic pressures.24 Regulators should therefore be required
to explain in detail which studies are likely to resolve particular scientific
uncertainties, and why the anticipated findings may warrant interim regu-
latory strategies.
It is equally important for agencies to explain why many scientific
uncertainties cannot be eliminated in the immediate future.249 Given the
propensity of affected parties to challenge agency determinations on every
possible ground, regulators should preemptively acknowledge their inabil-
ity to provide dispositive scientific answers to many important questions.
It is true that this degree of candor may sometimes lead to adverse appel-
late decisions, but experience indicates that judicial review of past agency
practices has been at least as intrusive. 50 Only through explicit considera-
tion of prevailing uncertainties and the policies appropriate to determine
their social consequences can regulators hope to persuade legislatures and
appellate courts that requirements for precise quantitative assessments of
toxic risks are unrealistic and invite either agency paralysis or unreliable
speculation. The social policy criteria identified in this Part can justify
adoption of more (or less) protective risk estimates despite continuing
uncertainty about toxic risks, but regulators must emphasize the policy-
oriented bases of their decisions and must explain why they frequently
cannot provide reliable scientific conclusions without indefinitely delaying
the imposition of protective controls or compromising other statutory
objectives.
The National Research Council study of risk-assessment problems
advised regulatory agencies to adopt generic approaches for risk-
assessment problems on the grounds that uniform science policy guidelines
247. For a discussion of whether this type of social benefits criterion should be reserved for risk-
management analyses or should be incorporated in risk assessments, see infra text accompanying
notes 252-63.
248. Moreover, the history of environmental control programs indicates that interim pollution
control standards often remain in effect indefinitely as a result of agency inertia and higher regulatory
priorities. See Latin, supra note 11, at 1305-07, 1319-20.
249. Although scientists have acquired useful information about diverse carcinogenesis processes
during the past decade, few if any of the critical uncertainties have been resolved. See, e.g., NArIONAL
RESE.ARCH COUNCIl., supra note 1, at 28-37; EPA DECISION MAKING, supra note 5, at 65; Preuss
& White, supra note 43, at 335. Many of these uncertainties stem from inadequate scientific under-
standing rather than inadequate data, and cannot necessarily be remedied by well-funded research
programs. See Latin, supra note 11, at 1283.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 203-23.
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"could help separate risk assessment from risk management considera-
tions, improve public understanding of the process, foster consistency, and
prevent oversights and judgments that are inconsistent with current scien-
tific thought." '' It is often advisable for regulatory agencies to rely on
generic treatments of recurring scientific issues, but generic policies cannot
resolve all scientific and social policy questions in each toxic risk-
assessment proceeding. Particularized circumstances, such as those per-
taining to the potential for catastrophic errors or the likelihood that spe-
cific uncertainties can be resolved, would preclude resolution of all uncer-
tainties in a consistent fashion. Requiring agencies to provide cogent
reasons for their treatments of varied types of scientific uncertainty may
be more realistic and more important than a high degree of uniformity in
risk-assessment outcomes.
B. Interaction of Risk Assessment and Risk Management
Most discussions of risk assessment stress the need for scientists or reg-
ulators to identify significant uncertainties and to explain the assumptions
used to resolve them.252 EPA's carcinogen guidelines acknowledge "in
every quantitative risk estimation that the results are uncertain" '253 and
then provide:
Whichever method of presentation is chosen, it is critical that the
numerical estimates not be allowed to stand alone, separated from
the various assumptions and uncertainties upon which they are
based. The risk characterization should contain a discussion and
interpretation of the numerical estimates that affords the risk man-
ager some insight into the degree to which the quantitative estimates
are likely to reflect the true magnitude of human risk, which gener-
ally cannot be known with the degree of quantitative accuracy
reflected in the numerical estimates . . . . Major assumptions, scien-
tific judgments, and, to the extent possible, estimates of the uncer-
tainties embodied in the assessment are presented. 54
This aspirational proviso does not ensure that risk managers can make
meaningful judgments on the basis of an agency's recitation of unresolved
issues. An extensive list of scientific uncertainties would not, by itself, be
very useful for agency risk managers or for public understanding of toxic
hazards. Neither is the common agency practice of pairing discussions of
251. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 162; see also id. at 69-82.
252. See id. at 153-54, 164, 169.
253. EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,997 (1986).
254. Id. at 33,999.
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uncertain factors that may induce overestimation of risks with other inde-
terminate factors that may understate risks. EPA's carcinogen guidelines
and benzene regulations fail to explain adequately the possible dimensions
and ramifications of many uncertainties, and they clearly do not provide
enough information for risk managers to determine the appropriate regu-
latory consequences of scientific uncertainty. This observation is not
intended as a criticism of past agency practices because the proposed allo-
cation of responsibilities is fundamentally unrealistic. Only risk assessors
are likely to understand the dimensions and implications of particular
uncertainties sufficiently well to make effective social policy judgments on
how those uncertainties should be resolved. If risk assessors cannot accom-
plish this task, risk managers could seldom be expected to make informed
choices on the same issues.
In order to communicate a sense of the uncertainties in risk-assessment
predictions, for example, some agency risk assessors believe their findings
should be expressed as ranges of potential hazards at varying exposure
levels, while other experts prefer discrete point estimates.255 EPA's 1984
benzene regulation observed:
EPA has concluded that the presentation of the risk estimates as
ranges does not offer significant advantages . . . [Rianges for ben-
zene make risk comparisons among source categories more difficult
and tend to create a false impression that the bounds of the risks are
known with certainty. For these reasons, the benzene risks . . .are
presented as point estimates of the leukemia risk.256
EPA's carcinogen guidelines, in contrast, provide that a range of upper-
and lower-limit risks should be explicitly stated in the assessment when-
ever possible. "57 The guidelines do not explain why EPA reversed its pre-
vious position on risk ranges and never address the problems identified in
the quoted passage. The guidelines also concede that an "established pro-
cedure does not yet exist for making 'most likely' or 'best' estimates of risk
within the range of uncertainty defined by the upper- and lower-limit
estimates." '58 In view of the many uncertainties in toxic risk assessment, it
is unclear whether risk ranges or point estimates create more of "a false
impression that the bounds of the risks are known with certainty." It is
doubtful that risk managers can select risk estimates intelligently from
255. For example, The DHS report derived a range of possible benzene risks that varied by a
factor of about eight. See supra text accompanying notes 171-173.
256. EPA Regulation of Benzene, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478, 23,493 (1984).
257. See EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,998 (1986).
258. Id. The caveat in the text invites skepticism about how accurate the upper- and lower-limit
boundary estimates are likely to be.
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within ranges in which the upper and lower bounds may differ by several
orders of magnitude, and yet the apparent precision of specific point esti-
mates is likely to be misleading.
There is little if any evidence that agency administrators carefully tailor
their decisions in light of the uncertainties identified in the risk assess-
ment. Instead, risk managers generally accept risk estimates as gospel and
then examine economic and political issues relevant to the toxic substance
at issue. Indeed, the scientists most responsible for conducting EPA risk
assessments evidently recognize that risk managers accept their quantita-
tive estimates uncritically regardless of accompanying qualifiers which
describe unresolved issues. Consider the following exchange at a 1985
symposium on risk assessment:
Professor Merrill: Dr. Albert, you indicated the program officers at
EPA were insisting on a mathematical expression of risk. Were they
insisting on the mathematical integration of those qualifiers?
Dr. Albert: They didn't really know. It is evident that if there is
weak qualitative evidence for carcinogenicity, it ought to be factored
into the quantitative assessment. If one regards the public health
impact of cancer in terms of the excess estimated numbers of cancer
cases, then that estimated impact should be clearly reduced by weak
qualitative evidence.
Dr. Preuss: If you could present them separately and discuss them
and give the person making the decision some idea of the strengths
and the weaknesses on both sides.
Dr. Albert: All they seem to want to know is "Is it a carcinogen or
isn't it a carcinogen?"
Dr. Preuss: And you're going to tell them it's 0.03 of a carcinogen?
Dr. Albert: No. The bottom line here is the estimate of the number
of cancer cases, and that is reduced in proportion to some arbitrary
scaling of the probability that the agent really is a human
carcinogen.2 59
In other words, Dr. Albert's Carcinogen Assessment Group may reduce
its best-guess risk estimate by some "arbitrary scaling" to reflect the pres-
ence of scientific uncertainty, but he does not expect the Agency's risk
managers to understand that adjustment. Under this "good science" proce-
dure, EPA risk assessors do not explicitly tailor risk estimates in light of
social policy judgments and risk managers do not modify the estimates at
all. Dr. Preuss observed to Dr. Albert later in the symposium discussion
259. Comments, supra note 46, at 328-29.
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"[m]y concern, Roy, is that all of the qualifications get lost and we focus
on that number."2 ' These candid statements by Agency experts indicate
that social policy criteria must be incorporated into the risk-assessment
process if they are to have any significant effect on the choice among com-
peting estimates under conditions of scientific uncertainty. As previously
emphasized, alternative predictions may vary by several orders of magni-
tude, and a risk assessor's selection of a speculative estimate can determine
the ultimate regulatory decision irrespective of any social policies and val-
ues adopted in the risk-management process.
For example, analysis of whether adequate substitutes exist for a poten-
tially toxic product or process is usually regarded as a risk-management
function. The social value of a toxic chemical is determined in part by the
availability of safer alternatives, and the existence of reasonable product
substitutes would clearly be an important element in the risk-utility bal-
ancing comparison that often forms the heart of risk-management deliber-
ations. If the risk manager is provided with a prediction that the substance
under investigation poses only a minuscule hazard, the administrator
would be unlikely to regulate that substance although safer substitutes are
in common usage. Yet, the agency's risk estimate may be unreliable from
a scientific perspective, even if it is the best-current-guess, and adoption of
different risk-assessment assumptions could suggest a much greater dan-
ger. Because risk managers are seldom equipped or disposed to modify
risk estimates, it may be appropriate for risk assessors to increase the con-
servative bias in their estimates when available substitutes could achieve
reasonably equivalent functions.261 Thus, both risk assessors and risk
managers should evaluate social consequences and policy criteria in order
to perform their respective functions. This conclusion conflicts with the
position in EPA's carcinogen guidelines that risk estimates should be
derived "independently from considerations of the consequences of regula-
tory action. '
This Article's contention that agencies cannot wait until the risk-
management stage of toxic regulatory proceedings to address the social
ramifications of scientific uncertainty does not suggest that the distinction
between risk assessment and risk management should be abandoned. In
260. Comments, supra note 242, at 340.
261. For example, after the Fifth Circuit's decision on urea-formaldehyde foam insulation mil-
lions of people were subjected to low-level formaldehyde exposures despite the availability of other
forms of nontoxic insulation. When a toxic substance's primary benefit is a marginal cost advantage
over substitute products, agencies should not necessarily adopt the same risk-assessment treatments
that they employ in the context of new drugs, pesticides, or other hazardous materials that offer
distinctive benefits. Yet, most risk-assessment treatments do not consider this type of distinction
because it is based on social policy, not scientific, considerations.
262. EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,993 (1986).
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some toxic contexts, risk assessors can provide reliable estimates based on
generally accepted scientific principles. 263 There is no reason why risk
assessments in such contexts should be modified in response to policy cri-
teria when "good science" judgments can really be grounded on valid sci-
ence. Moreover, risk managers must address economic, political, and ethi-
cal factors relevant to each toxic substance even if the social policies
applied in the risk-assessment stage are incorporated in generic treatments
of recurring scientific issues. To the extent the conventional distinction
represents a real rather than symbolic division of decisionmaking respon-
sibilities, risk managers should retain the ultimate authority to determine
the scope of toxic regulations. Nevertheless, risk assessment inescapably
plays a central role in the toxic substances regulatory process and is too
uncertain to be treated exclusively as an exercise in "good science."
Conclusion
Environmentalists attack the risk-assessment process because they
believe it frequently produces unreliable estimates of toxic hazards and
because it is subject to manipulation by industrial dischargers and govern-
ment bureaucrats. However sympathetic one may be to these objections,
which surely have ample basis in past regulatory experience, society can-
not feasibly eliminate all carcinogenic risks nor enjoin use of all toxic sub-
stances. Society must therefore develop some rational method for deciding
which risks are unacceptable and for allocating scarce regulatory
resources. Notwithstanding the risk-assessment uncertainties and analyti-
cal shortcomings emphasized in this Article, it is unlikely that regulators
should or could eliminate attempts to estimate the dimensions of diverse
toxic hazards. Moreover, after a decade of intrusive appellate decisions
and political emphasis on cost-effectiveness justifications, risk-assessment
procedures are firmly embedded in the federal regulatory agencies respon-
sible for toxic substances control. In short, we are largely past the ques-
tion of whether to assess toxic risks, and must now determine how to
improve the quality of regulatory decisionmaking in order to promote the
legislative goals and social values reflected in environmental protection
programs.
There have been any number of discussions in the legal and public
policy literature about mechanisms intended to improve the efficiency of
environmental regulation through reliance on cost-benefit, risk-utility, or
263. In the case of some noncarcinogenic toxic substances, such as cotton dust and lead, that have
been in use for many decades and produce chronic effects after long-term exposures, scientists may be
able to obtain reliable epidemiologic data and identify reasonably accurate dose-response relationships.
See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 505 n.25 (1981).
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cost-effectiveness analyses. These strategies are fundamentally dependent
on the quality of regulatory risk assessments, and yet most commentators
treat the risk-assessment process as a "black box" and assume that agen-
cies must always produce the best available scientific predictions regard-
less of the imperfect state of the art. Regulators cannot avoid determining
the social and legal consequences of scientific uncertainty, but there is no
assurance that they will do so in a systematic manner responsive to legis-
lative objectives. Not only have agencies generally failed to explain the
implicit policies that shape their risk-assessment practices, but it also
appears that regulators often have not recognized the social ramifications
of their own treatments. Moreover, current risk-assessment practices are
less consistent and less reliable than agency scientists typically concede.
Because predictions of toxic effects generally cannot be grounded on
reliable scientific judgments, social policy criteria must play an influential
role in the choice among competing risk estimates. Once we recognize that
toxic substances regulation requires a panoply of policy determinations to
supplement provisional scientific judgments, it is essential that risk-
assessment agencies explicitly consider the social ramifications of scientific
uncertainty, strive for analytical coherence in their treatments of currently
indeterminate issues, and clearly explain the principles, practices, and val-
ues underlying particular estimates of toxic hazards.
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